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Karadzic, Izetbegovic Assess Progress in Geneva

LD0212164493 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1518 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Geneva, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—During a break in the Serb-Muslim talks in Geneva, Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic of Srpska, said: "We are making good progress." Karadzic said that they spoke mostly about Sarajevo and that there was some agreement on dividing the city into two parts—one third Serb and two thirds Muslim.

On the other hand, Alija Izetbegovic, the leader of the Bosnian Muslims, denied any progress in negotiations. According to him, there is no progress in the talks on Sarajevo, eastern Bosnia or Bosnia Krajina. According to Karadzic, who was the first to address journalists, no final agreement has been reached, but the atmosphere of the talks is promising. He said that this inspires hope about the possibility of an imminent agreement.

Observers at the Geneva talks expect the course of this crucial meeting to be clarified after this afternoon's round of talks which will be attended by the two chairmen of the Geneva conference.

Karadzic categorically rejected the need for UN administration of Sarajevo. He referred to the previous proposal by the Serb side that foreign troops are unnecessary. He judges that 5,000 military observers are sufficient and that this is the least expensive solution for the international community, while Bosnia's new borders would be guaranteed by the neighboring states, the European Union [EU], Russia and the United States.

Karadzic, speaking on the subject of the organization of the future republics, said that Serbs are not opposed to living in an alliance or living in their own state.

In a statement made soon after by the delegation of Bosnian Muslims, concern was voiced about the alleged danger of the EU initiative collapsing. The Muslim delegation claimed that the Serb side fails to honor the obligations resulting from the EU action plan and the agreement reached on board the Invincible regarding territorial concessions to Muslims.

Karadzic Interview Cited

AU0212222193 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Report by Milorad Denda from Geneva]

[Text] Just as has been forecast, the talks of [republic of Srpska president] Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik [chairman of the republic of Srpska assembly] on one side and [Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President] Alija Izetbegovic and [Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister] Haris Silajdzic on the other regarding territorial demarcation of the Serbian and the Muslim state in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina brought no definitive solutions or conclusion. However, the fact that the possibilities for potential territorial agreements have been thoroughly examined in long daily debates about this topic, which lasted for nearly eight hours, is viewed favorably.

Contrary to brief statements by Izetbegovic and Silajdzic that there were no results and progress, cochairman of the conference Stoltenberg this evening assessed that the talks were constructive and held in a good atmosphere, that bilateral talks will continue in the coming week, that a good basis for future talks has been created, that they will strive to obtain a result that would facilitate a peace agreement by Christmas, and that an agreement was not expected at all in this four-day round of talks.

He positively assessed the agreement of the two sides allowing free movement of civilians within Sarajevo and the possibility that they could move in the part of the town in which they wish to live. President of the Serbian Republic Radovan Karadzic in talks with Yugoslav journalists also pointed to this positive fact. The first question asked for his assessment of the results of the talks, in light of the Muslim constant negation of any progress and results in the talks:

[Begin recording] [Karadzic] Belittling the results of these talks and their atmosphere is a purely propagandistic move. Essentially, the talks were very constructive and took place in a very favorable atmosphere. It is, therefore, positive that the talks were continued. It was decided that Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Silajdzic continue meetings at Sarajevo airport and further work at an accelerated pace on all issues that remained controversial. I can say that a great part of the territory is uncontested. Some adjustments remain controversial. We also discussed Sarajevo a lot, but we did not conclude anything. However, we examined various possibilities, all this very openly and sincerely.

It is very significant that the Muslim side responded positively to our demand for safeguarding free movement of civilians and the right to freely chose the place of abode. It seems that this is a considerable achievement for the Serbian and the Muslim sides. We can soon expect residents choosing freely to go to the territory of their choice.

[Unidentified reporter] How are the talks about the status of Sarajevo progressing? We have proposed that two towns be there. There was mention of a third for the Serbian part and two thirds for the others. How far have you gotten here? Which of the several options that you have presented is the most realistic one? What will you continue to discuss?

[Karadzic] I believe that we will pursue the concept of two towns-twins, that is to say, two neighboring towns. Naturally, there are many uncontested territories that the Serbs do not dispute to the Muslims and vice versa. However, there are some sensitive areas that are still disputed, either by the Serbs or by the Muslims, and have not been resolved yet. Therefore, we cannot say

that an agreement was reached. However, the talks have made a considerable progress in definition of these two towns.

[Unidentified reporter] When do you expect that the talks could resume?

[Karadzic] I hope that in December we will first hold several meetings at the airport and then perhaps all together. In the European milieu there is a desire to reach an agreement before Christmas. I do not know whether the agreement can be reached before Christmas, but we are willing to contribute toward this.

[Unidentified reporter] Mr. Karadzic, a day ago there was some talk about eastern Bosnia, about the enclaves that practically represent the Muslim demands toward the Serbian Republic.

[Karadzic] Yes, unfortunately we had to be very frank here. There can be no partitioning of the Serbian territory as this is a question of survival. We can truly make no more concessions there. We, that is to say, the Serbian side has promoted another approach, namely, that the Serbs and the Croats would for a moment delay their solutions [word indistinct], that the Serbs and the Croats would turn toward the creation of one, living territory for the Muslim state. Then the Serbs and the Croats could carry out wider scale exchanges of territories, equalization, and rounding up of the territories, after which the 33.3 percent would be secured to the Muslims. Or, once the Muslims have gotten 33.3 percent they can deliberately go below this percentage for the sake of quality and other benefits.

Therefore, we should ignore the percentages and speak of, I would say, a functioning state that would be capable of surviving and that would definitely have the right of access to the sea. This should also apply to the Serbs as the sea belongs to everybody. On the basis of the Corfu Declaration of (?1978) the sea belongs to everybody, although [words indistinct] everybody has the right to it, that is, the access to the sea.

[Unidentified reporter] Thank you. [end recording]

Talks End 'Without a Solution'

AU0212155693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Geneva]

[Text] It is said that yet another Geneva will end today. The parties will leave without a solution, but not without hope. Territorial solutions, an outlet to the sea, and humanitarian problems were discussed. All these issues can be answered with both a yes and a no. The EC, whose initiative brought everyone to Geneva, has applied maximal pressure to both the Croats and the Serbs, demanding at least 33.3 percent of the territory of the current Bosnia-Herzegovina for the future Bosnian republic and a sovereign outlet to the sea near Neum.

According to the statement of Lord Owen, who said that the demands were in principle acceptable, no one has anything against this, but no one is willing to sign. The Serbs and the Croats were not ready to do so at the time [sentence as heard]. Nevertheless, the basics have been agreed upon, only details remain. They will be discussed on 15 December, when, we have learned, the Geneva negotiations will resume.

The current round of the Geneva negotiations was exhausting and difficult, assessed Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Presidency, particularly when the Serbs wanted to change both the agenda and the contents of the European peace initiative by forcing separate talks on Sarajevo. Luckily, this was not expected. Territorial solutions were discussed, but general ones, for the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, Sarajevo is linked to the other territorial solutions. Radovan Karadzic had gone so far as to tell reporters that Sarajevo had been definitely partitioned. However, that is not true. You had the chance to see what the truth about Sarajevo is from the statement made by Dr. Muhamed Filipovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation in Geneva.

The outlet to the sea near Neum for the future Bosnian republic has been agreed on in principle, but details still need to be settled. Prior to leaving Geneva, the Palace of Nations, that is, Mate Boban said: We will discuss the outlet to the sea on 15 December, when we return to Geneva. Even from this very cautious remark of Boban's we can conclude that the outlet to the sea is a certainty, but it is obvious that Boban himself is still uncertain as to what he can definitely and concretely agree to, so he has probably gone to Zagreb for additional instructions or for his opinion.

Yet another Geneva is behind us, and we are awaiting a new one. As far as the expectations and desires of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation are concerned, the most important thing would be to find a solution for such a Bosnia-Herzegovina in which Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim citizens could once again live together.

This has been Nada al-Isa reporting from Geneva for Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbs Making 'No Concessions'

AU0212185493 Paris AFP in English 1828 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Geneva, Dec 2 (AFP)—Bosnian Moslem leaders Thursday accused Serb rivals of threatening peace talks here by refusing to make further territorial concessions for an overall peace accord as they headed to a final round of talks. Moslem delegates also denied an agreement had been reached to partition the Bosnian capital Sarajevo.

Peace negotiations, which resumed Monday after a two-month break, "could fail" said Bosnia-Herzegovina's Ambassador to the United Nations Muhamed Sacirbey, because the Serbs remained "unwilling to go further" on Moslem demands for more territory in the east and west of the former Yugoslav republic.

"There is no agreement on Sarajevo" without agreement on territorial concessions elsewhere and "there are no concessions whatsoever by the Serbian side on territory," Sacirbey said.

The Geneva talks collapsed two months ago after the Moslems rejected a peace deal under which they stood to gain 30 percent of the territory.

Negotiations between the Serbs, Moslems and Croats resumed Monday under European Community auspices, with the 12-nation E.C. calling on the Serbs to cede between three and four percent of their territory so it could be incorporated into a future Moslem mini-state. All three ethnic communities were to have formed mini-states under the failed peace proposal.

Conference spokesman John Mills earlier reported "slow but real progress" at the talks here and said more bilateral meetings between the Serbs and Moslems on the territorial issue and the partitioning of Sarajevo were planned for next week. Mediators Lord Owen (for the E.C.) and Thorvald Stoltenberg (for the U.N.) would attend, he said.

Sacirbey, speaking on behalf of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, accused the Serb delegation of concentrating on the partition of the capital, but "there is no agreement on Sarajevo," he said.

Serb delegation leader Radovan Karadzic said earlier the two sides had agreed that two-thirds of Sarajevo would go to the Moslems.

The mainly-Moslem government would have preferred the mediators' proposal to place the capital under U.N. control for two years, Sacirbey said. A bloody, 20-month-old siege of the city and the absence of international support had forced the Moslems to negotiate, in hopes of getting a territorial solution for all of Bosnia. However the Serbs had no desire to compromise, the Bosnian ambassador added.

His government planned to contact Brussels and was opposed to any suspension of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro because the Serbs had made no territorial concessions, he said. The E.C. had proposed a progressive suspension of U.N.-imposed sanctions on rump Yugoslavia if the Serbs gave away a little more land to the Moslems and reached a modus vivendi in Krajina, a Serb- controlled part of Croatia.

Sacirbey said his side was "losing confidence" in the E.C.'s ability to influence the Serbs who, he charged, wanted to continue to dictate their will through war.

Earlier, Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban left the talks, saying he would be ready to return in mid-December. Boban said the Moslems' other main demand—for access to the Adriatic Sea at Neum—would be discussed at the next meeting. He said he believed that despite the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, "the differences between Moslems and Croats can be resolved."

However the Croatian news agency HINA quoted Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic as saying Croatia was "prepared to discuss economic issues with the Moslems but will not make territorial concessions."

On the ground, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) reported fierce fighting Wednesday in the regions of the southern town of Mostar and Olovo, north of Sarajevo.

An International Committee of the Red Cross spokesman said some 710 Croat and Moslem prisoners in the two sectors of Mostar would be exchanged on Sunday under ICRC auspices.

Meanwhile an aid convoy arrived Thursday in the Moslem enclave of Gorazde in eastern Bosnia, for the first time since November 7, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Stoltenberg Replaced as Special UN Envoy

LD0212192093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1851 GMT 2 Dec 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] New York, Dec 2 (TANJUG)—Norwegian diplomat Thorwald Stoltenberg has been replaced as the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general for former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mission chief. Japanese diplomat Jasushi Akashi has been appointed in his place.

Stoltenberg will still represent the United Nations as co-chairman of the Geneva International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.

Moscow Expert on Policy for Former Yugoslavia

94BA0111B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 7 Nov 93 pp 12-13

[Article including interview with Dr. Boris Shmelev, director of the Center for Foreign Policy Research in the Moscow Institute for World Economics and Politics, by Bogoljub Lacmanovic; place and date not given: "We Expect the End of the War in Bosnia and Croatia Next Year"]

[Text] "The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was neither premature nor mistaken. Those politicians and political scientists in the West, and there are also some in Russia, are wrong who even now are half-aloud accusing Germany of having taken the initiative and put pressure on the European Community to recognize the Slovene and Croatian states and thereby destabilized the situation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The situation in Yugoslavia at that time was already intolerably destabilized, and Bonn was only the first to detect the logic of the historical process that multiethnic states are condemned to disintegration," Dr. Boris Shmelev, distinguished Russian Balkanologist, told VJESNIK at the beginning of the interview, and he went on:

"However, the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state was not only premature, but an absolutely mistaken step on the part of the West. It is difficult to determine whether that recognition occurred out of inertia or competing interests, but it is certain that that recognition resulted from a failure to understand the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ignorance of what Bosnia and Herzegovina was. Even the Vance-Owen plan to preserve the unified Bosnian state was erroneous, and they now acknowledge that. In short, because of the opposed interests of the three ethnic groups that live in it, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not viable as an independent and self-sufficient state.

"Whether certain countries and political forces in the world which are supporting a unified Bosnian state like it or not, it will not survive. The regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina predominantly inhabited by Serbs (the Srpska republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) will sooner or later be annexed to Serbia in some form. That also applies to the republic of Herceg-Bosna, which will move toward still more firmer linkage to Croatia. That is why the central problem of the Bosnian crisis is the fate of the Muslims, and the main task of the international community is to aim at creating a viable Muslim state."

Milosevic's Responsibility

There were three reasons behind the interview with Dr. Boris Shmelev, director of the Center for Foreign Policy Research in the famous Moscow Institute for World Economics and Politics. On the invitation of Vitaliy Churkin, Dr. Shmelev was for a week one of the participants in the small group of Russian academicians and experts in the closed conference in the Russian Foreign Ministry whose purpose was to work out the further strategy and policy of Kremlin diplomacy toward the problems for the former Yugoslavia. Second, as a distinguished Balkanologist and expert on the former Yugoslavia, Dr. Shmelev long ago had access to all the knowledge of the former Soviet state and world superpower concerning this region, and today of Russia as a great power on the international scene. Third, four years ago, when he was prorector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, I did an interview with Dr. Shmelev for VJESNIK, which had a great response in Croatia and Yugoslavia at that time, but it also caused him certain difficulties with the "higher ups" in Moscow. Even then and in that interview, Dr. Shmelev announced the likelihood of Yugoslavia's disintegration if it did not transform into a "soft" confederation, but he stated openly that in his opinion the unified Soviet state could be saved only as a confederation.

* * *

[Lacmanovic] Dr. Shmelev, in our interview for VJESNIK more than four years ago you announced the possibility of Yugoslavia's disintegration unless it transformed into a confederation. However, you did not expect that disintegration to be horribly bloody.

[Shmelev] In that interview and analysis, I neglected the role of the "subjective factor" in the processes that were on their way. The unwillingness or reluctance of the leaders of Yugoslavia, of Serbia first of all, to move in the direction of transformation of the state, was greater than I was able to spot from Moscow. Even now, I am profoundly convinced that the tragic development of events in Yugoslavia was not determined by the previous situation in the country, nor was it inevitable. However, Milosevic and the Serbian leaders took upon themselves a great historical responsibility by committing themselves to the policy of preserving Yugoslavia as it was created in 1945. Four years ago, it was reasonable to expect that the Yugoslav divorce would take place more slowly, and that means peacefully.

Churkin's Model

[Lacmanovic] Unlike you, because you refer to Milosevic as principally at fault for the bloody tragedy of the former Yugoslavia, Russian official policy has been attempting, especially concerning the war in Bosnia, to equate and even out the blame between all the sides to the conflict.

[Shmelev] The situation that prevails now in the former Yugoslavia does not allow one to say that this one is more to blame and that one less. Today, we must speak about a tragedy on the former Yugoslav space, and in a tragedy it is not a question of the good guys and the bad guys. There are victims, and those victims are the people who are dying.

Russian diplomacy has been consistent in its views. At one time, when Milosevic was not displaying enough wisdom that would have made it possible to avoid a bloody drama, Russian diplomacy harshly condemned Serbia and its president. After that, Russia took a balanced approach in assessing the situation that came about and its development, and that in my opinion is the right approach to the problem.

In the light of present reality and everything that has happened and is happening, it would be politically erroneous to condemn only Serbia and to support Croatia exclusively. And vice versa. Both sides failed to show enough flexibility and wisdom in good time. For example, when the Croatian Supreme Command decided to set out on the road of gaining independence as a state, and when it worked out all the circumstances and aspects of that project, it obviously underestimated the problem of the Serbs in Croatia and their political disposition. Zagreb also ignored the "memory" of the Serbs in Croatia dating from World War II. That disposition and frame of mind of the Serbs there should have been thoroughly and clearly worked out and taken into account, and a mutually acceptable concept of life together found and offered.

[Lacmanovic] If I have understood you correctly, you are supporting Vitaliy Churkin's idea of the so-called Serbian Krajina getting the status of a republic within the Croatian state. However, Croatia cannot and will not

accept that, especially not the way Churkin presented it this summer in the well-known GLOBUS interview. The Croatian Government sent a note to the Foreign Ministry because of that Churkin interview.

[Shmelev] In speaking about a Serbian autonomous republic within the Croatian state, Vitaliy Churkin set forth the only scenario for a peaceful exit of the situation from the blind alley. Along with all the rest, it is an erroneous and outdated idea that war should be waged and people should die in order to get back or subjugate any piece of territory. Wise men do that today by economic, not military, means. The territory of the Krajina should be drawn into economic and financial ties with Zagreb, and thus groups and strata interested in cooperation and firmer ties would be created among the Serbs there. That is, of course, the longer haul, but there are no human casualties, or at least fewer.

Detonator in Macedonia

[Lacmanovic] Solving the problem of the Albanians in Kosovo could destabilize neighboring Macedonia.

[Shmelev] That will probably be the case. Everything depends on the success of the Macedonian leadership in finding a common language with its Albanian inhabitants. As for the Albanians in Macedonia, we have information that the rise of their ethnic awareness will be more resolute than that of the Albanians in Kosovo. They are less well-organized, and that means less predictable in their reactions, and that disorganization could cause things to go out of control. I would go so far as to say that the Albanians in Macedonia might very well be the detonator for a gigantic explosion of the Albanian question in the former Yugoslavia.

[Lacmanovic] You took part in a recent conference in the Russian Foreign Ministry in which a new strategy of Kremlin diplomacy was set forth toward the former Yugoslavia and the new states that have been created in this region and for the postcrisis period.

[Shmelev] I would not say that any new strategy of ours was set forth at that conference. First, we established priorities in solving the problems of the former Yugoslavia. We put resolving the Bosnian crisis in first place at this moment, and then the use of influence to end the conflict between Serbia and Croatia. Second, we confirmed that it is correct for Russia to act in concert with the Western states in seeking solutions for the former Yugoslavia. This, of course, does not mean that Russia does not have its own views and will exclusively support the views of the West and the United States. Russia does have its own interests and views and will work them out with its Western partners.

In the conference, we also confirmed the view of our diplomatic corps that it continue to conduct a balanced policy toward all the states that have come into being on the former space of Yugoslavia. For us, there is no more or less important nation in the former Yugoslavia. For us, all those new states are equally important, and so in the postcrisis period, just like now, we will conduct equally good and comprehensive relations with them. At this moment, our desire with a balanced policy is to help all those states to find a way out of the crisis in which they have found themselves because of Yugoslavia's disintegration.

A Commonwealth in the Balkans

[Lacmanovic] At the end of our interview, would you be so bold, on the basis of the knowledge you have, to forecast how the geopolitical map of the former Yugoslavia will look at the end of this century?

[Shmelev] At the end of the century, there will be the same number of independent states in the Balkans that we have now. I only do not preclude the possibility of an independent Montenegrin state being created. Complicated processes are taking place now in Montenegro, and I notice a thrust from the West for Montenegro to separate from Serbia.

Slovenia will remain a unitary state, as will Montenegro, if it separates from Serbia. The optimum variant for Croatia is to reorganize as a federal state, granting autonomy to the Serbs in the Krajina. Istria and Dalmatia will not be federal units of the Croatian state, and they are not essentially interested in that. They want regional self-government, above all in the economic sphere, and Istria and Dalmatia will gain that objective. Up to the end of this century, Serbia will not be able to reorganize on federal principles. What is more, because of the economic sanctions it, along with the territory of Bosnia, will be in the most difficult situation. Assuming that the problem of Kosovo really begins to be resolved early in the next century, up until that time Macedonia will also remain a unitary state.

I expect the present acute problems of the former Yugoslavia (the Bosnian and Serbian-Croatian relations) to be largely worked out even in the coming year, which means that the next year will bring the end of the war there. People on the territory of the former Yugoslavia are tired of war, they are economically exhausted, and there will be no prosperity so long as armed conflict continues.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was historically predetermined, because that is the destiny of multinational states. The story about resurrection of Yugoslavia is just nonsense. However, the unified South Slav geopolitical space will remain and will develop. Incidentally, that also applies to the geopolitical space of the disintegrated USSR, even if the Russian federation pays for its reforms the price of creating a confederation.

Although they cannot or do not want to do it, the former Yugoslav republics, now independent states, are simply "condemned" to mutual cooperation, especially in the economic domain. So I do not preclude in the future, when a new generation of politicians comes along and people push into the background and forget the present

bloody drama, that is, in the next century, a political-economic alliance, for example, something like the Commonwealth, may be created on that South Slav territory.

[Box, p 12]

Kosovo Must Remain in Serbia

[Lacmanovic] We spoke at the beginning of 1989. You saw the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia at that time in the crisis in Kosovo.

[Shmelev] In the Yugoslav crisis, I single out three main problems: the Serbian-Croatian contradictions, the Bosnian issue, and then Kosovo. Even with all the entanglement of the first two problems, Kosovo remains the most complicated question of the former Yugoslavia, because it carries within it the danger of a third Balkan war breaking out, of Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece being drawn into that war. There is no question that the Albanians in Kosovo have the right to self-determination all the way to secession and formation of their independent state. That right is not an invention of the bolsheviki and Lenin. The right of nationalities to self-determination was supported even in the 14 Points of President Wilson, who said that the Kurds in Turkey have the right to create a nation state. However, for pragmatic reasons and in order to avoid a Balkan war, the politicians of Europe, the United States, and Russia are pretty much in agreement that at this point they do not want to encourage a struggle of the Albanians in Kosovo for self-determination. In that situation, the right way would be to help the Albanians in Kosovo to gain all the rights of an ethnic minority and for the international community to state publicly that they do not approve its leaving Serbia, that is, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

[Lacmanovic] But political statements are one thing and the process of life something else.

[Shmelev] Right. Maksim Gorky, the proletarian writer, said that rights are not given, but taken. Which means that if the right of the Albanians to self-determination is disputed, they may decide to realize it by force. Serbia will not agree with Kosovo's departure without a fight, and the international community will not allow Serbia to engage in a bloody battle. The Kosovo problem, then, is in a blind alley, and the international community can only postpone its resolution. Reasonable politicians always take into account the consequences, but in real politics, unlike science, it is not always possible to be consistent, so that the Kosovo problem remains a time bomb.

[Box, p 13]

Autonomy for the Serbs

[Lacmanovic] The Croatian president and government have offered peaceful solutions for life together which the Serbs, driven by the separatist idea, have persistently rejected. Zagreb has been continually seeking a way out of this problem, and there is evidence of that in the most recent peace initiative of President Tudjman, which grants the Serbs autonomy in the kotars of Knin and Glina and cultural autonomy in those regions where they constitute more than a majority.

[Shmelev] In my judgment, President Tudjman's most recent peace initiative is a step in the right and necessary direction, making it possible to solve a difficult problem on the territory of Croatia. If it had been taken two years ago, I am convinced that there would have been no bloody tragedy in Croatia or it would have been on a much smaller scale.

[Box, p 13]

A Muslim State

The way to create a viable Muslim state is to place the territory now under control of the Muslims under a mandate of the United Nations and Security Council and deploy international armed forces on that territory that will guarantee its stability and independence. Sarajevo, as a multinational city, ought to have the status which Trieste had from 1947 to 1953, and that should be under administration of the Security Council. Only in that case, and after a period of 20 or 30 years, could conditions be created for the Muslim state on the territory of the present Bosnia and Herzegovina to be viable. As far as I know, Fikret Abdic accepts this version of a resolution. I see no other way out of the Bosnian crisis, and the alternative is endless continuation of the bloody Bosnian turmoil, because neither the Serbs nor the Croats nor the Muslims can win that war.

Of course, the Muslim state should be guaranteed an outlet to the sea; safe areas will have to be created to provide the Muslim enclaves interconnection. The international community has enough strength to apply pressure on the Serbian and Croatian sides to consent to improvement of the geopolitical position of the Muslim state. Pressure is also needed on Izetbegovic to take a more flexible position. The present rigid behavior of Izetbegovic is related to the support he has, above all from the United States. However, regardless of the interests motivating it, I am convinced that Washington will change its approach to the problem, which is leading the Bosnian crisis down the blind alley.

Italy's Balkan Policy Criticized

94BA0117B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 9 Nov 93 p 6

[Article by Paolo Paravel: "Italy's Adriatic Policy"]

[Text] *The Trieste IL PICCOLO is reporting on Italy's diplomatic assistance to Serbia in getting rid of the international sanctions; the role of Italian irredentists.*

Trieste, 8 Nov—A few days ago the Trieste daily IL PICCOLO, which is very attentively monitoring relations among Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia, and likewise the conflict in the Balkans, published the news that Italian diplomacy was proposing the admission of the

Serbian-Montenegrin confederation to the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the Central European Initiative, even though it has not been internationally recognized and international economic sanctions against it are in effect. Italy is thus supposedly trying to restrain the German influence in Slovenia and Croatia. Since the effects of such an action would be exactly the opposite, the motives should probably be sought elsewhere.

A week or so earlier, the same IL PICCOLO analyzed even more precisely the now obvious evidence of a real political and military conspiratorial alliance between Italian neo-irredentism and Serbian extremism: The Serbs are to help the Italian right to prepare the Italian authorities for a sudden adventurist change in foreign policy toward Croatia and Slovenia, and the Italians are to help the Serbs to end the policy of sanctions, thus sowing confusion in Croatia and destabilizing Slovenia.

This scenario (on which DELO already reported some important elements back in January) is already viewed with concern by some people in Italy, in view of the foreseeable effects of a chain-reaction destabilization in the entire Danube basin-Balkan area, and they are wondering why the detonator—Italian irredentism—is not immediately eliminated by those who could and should do so: the Italian Government.

It really is difficult to understand that Italy's two-track policy in this regard, first toward the former Yugoslavia and now toward Slovenia and Croatia, could suit European interests: On one hand, Italy is stating that it is in favor of good economic and political relations and is also striving for them, and on the other, at the same time it is financing and supporting irredentism, just as during the time of Cavour and his successors.

Senator Arduino Agnelli, one of the most tireless middlemen among various irredentisms and transversal aspirations for power in Italy, Serbia, Greece, and Romania, is playing this role convincingly and citing Garibaldi and Mazzini.

Apparently equally convincing is the very active Ambassador Pietro Ago, who is succeeding, in the name of the Foreign Ministry (i.e., the government) in simultaneously supporting Serbia in Europe, forcing the irredentists' demands upon Slovenia and Croatia, convincing the naive Istrian minority to consider him its representative, and denying the rights of the Slovene minority in Italy. The lists of people, facts, and complex and disturbing alliances could be even longer.

The main analytical key to all of this obviously lies in the fact that we are clearly no longer in Cavour's times, or the year 1914, but rather on the threshold of the third millennium and European integration into an increasingly more closely linked global political and economic system. The nationalistic aggressions from the Balkans that are now infecting Italy and other European states are thus no longer merely physiological evolutions of past history, but rather a pathological decaying of the sociopolitical and moral fabric of modern times.

It is primarily for that reason that democratic Italy should ask itself and allow others to ask it—before it is too late—who is really conducting Italy's Adriatic policy, where, and why.

German Embassy Cited on Toxic Pesticides

LD0212142393 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1120 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—In connection with the discovery of several hundred tonnes of exceptionnally toxic pesticides imported into Albania from Germany—which pose a threat to the whole region—the German Embassy in Belgrade conveyed to TANJUG a statement by its government in which it says: "The German Government is aware of the acute danger for the environment constituted by the pesticides stored in 17 freight cars at Bajze railway station."

The German Embassy in Tirana, the statement continues, warned the Albanian authorities of the danger, advising them to make the chemicals safe, as suggested by a group of German experts. The German experts—on the orders of the Federal Ministry of Environment—inspected the site where the pesticides were stored.

Albania ordered about 460 tonnes of pesticides and at the time of delivery the exported goods complied with German legal regulations, the statement reads. The German foreign and environment ministries maintain that the German side should offer to help Albania in providing safe storage for the pesticides. "However, the process of coordinating stands between relevant departments has not yet been completed, i.e., it has not yet been decided to what extent the Albanian side will participate in this, or in what way the German side will finance these safety measures," the statement reads. [passage omitted]

Berisha Urges Muslim Investment in Albania

LD0212115793 Tehran IRNA in English 1138 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Athens, Dec. 2, IRNA—Albanian President Sali Berisha has called on Muslim countries to contribute in the development of his country by making investments. In statements made to Saudi weekly paper AL-MUSLIMUN Berisha said he has managed to create the suitable framework to facilitate investments from abroad.

A 3-day confernce aimed at promoting investments in Albania was held in Tirana 22-24 november. A large number of Arab businessmen and representatives from the World Bank and the European Community participated in the first conference of its kind. The meeting was held on the initiative of the Islamic Development Bank.

Berisha told the Arab paper that Albania and Saudi Arabia enjoyed strong ties and hoped that the two countries would soon open embassies in their capitals. At present there are only three Arab embassies in Tirana, Egypt, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Albania is the only Muslim-majority state in Europe.

Berisha on European Integration, Friendship With Greece

PM0212174093 London THE EUROPEAN in English 3-9 Dec 93 p 2

[Report on interview with Albanian President Sali Berisha by Julie Read in Tirana; date not given]

[Text] Tirana—The president of Albania, Dr Sali Berisha, has spoken of his hopes for the future for his country as part of the European Union. In an exclusive interview with THE EUROPEAN, he also looked forward to an era of cooperation and friendship with neighbouring Greece after a long period of tension between the two countries.

"My greater dream is the integration of Albania into Europe," he said. "We lie at the heart of Europe and feel European above all else. Of course, it will not happen overnight." Berisha is looking to Greece, which takes over the European presidency on 1 January, to help Albanian achieve membership.

After six fraught months of tension between Albania and Greece—sparked by the expulsion of a Greek Orthodox priest from southern Albania and the subsequent retaliation by Greece, which sent hundreds of thousands of Albanians back across the border—Berisha feels that a new understanding has now been reached.

The turning point was the recent visit to Tirana of the Greek foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias, to thrash out the problem of the Greek minority in southern Albanian and of Albanians in Greece. "Papoulias' visit heralded a new chapter for us," said Berisha.

"After all, we need to stick together. We are Balkan neighbours living in a tumultuous region." A joint commission has indeed been set up to oversee the problems of the Albanians in Greece.

The proximity of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo is Berisha's greatest anxiety. "What scares me most is an explosion in Kosovo," he said. "If the international community accepts the disappearance of Kosovo, it will be the most dangerous precedent seen since 1939, not least because it would drag in the Albanian minority in Macedonia."

Unlike Greece, which is pushing to ease the sanctions imposed on Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, Berisha stands firm alongside the European Union. In his clear, eloquent English, Berisha does not mince his words when talking about his Serb counterpart. "It is imperative not to allow President Milosevic to shift the war to the south, and the pressure on him must not be relaxed," he said.

"I hope that any lifting of the embargo against Yugoslavia is linked with a settlement agreeable to Kosovo and Krajina."

As for his neighbours to the east, Berisha brushes aside the recent arrest of nine Albanians in Macedonia

(accused of smuggling arms acrss the border and "conspiring for a Greater Albanian government") as a ploy by opponents to stir up trouble.

Berisha, 49, has given his country its first democratic government since the war. Born into a peasant family, he trained abroad to become a cardiologist of international repute.

As head of the governing Democratic Party he says that his mission now is to drag Albania out of the legacy of economic bankruptcy he inherited, caused primarily by the former regime, and then by the rapid transition from state control to a free-market economy.

"Fifteen months ago inflation was running at between 20 and 40 per cent, and has now dropped to one per cent a month," he said.

Census Data on Macedonian Albanians Condemned

AU0212211393 Tirana ATA in English 1125 GMT 2 Dec 93

["New Speculations by Macedonian Politicians Regarding the Number of the Albanian Population in Macedonia"—ATA Commentary]

[Text] Tirana, December 2 (ATA)—The Macedonian Government decided recently that the census of the population be made from April 1-15, 1994. This decision, imposed mainly by external factors, is expected now to be approved by the parliament. RILINDJA writes that manipulations have started for the percentages of nationalities living in Macedonia.

The Albanian population of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and their distribution in the country have been continuously a matter of discussion. But now manipulations are being made as for their number and autochthomy. Recently, Macedonian circles have presented allegedly new data according to which Albanians, whom they had until recently claimed had come from Albania, have now come from Kosova. According to them, this is also the cause for the disruption of the national structure of the population to the detriment of the Macedonian population.

These speculations, made in an effort to convince the home and foreign opinion that the number of the Albanians is small, have become common in the daily statements by politicians as Gollubovski up to President Gligorov. In a statement by Mr. Gligorov after talks with a German delegation recently, that Albanians will themselves be convinced that they are not as many as they say [sentence as received]. For the Slavic-Macedonians, the Albanians do not comprise even the one fifth of the 2.2 million population of Macedonia. But falsifications do not hold water any more. Albanians are in a greater number, twice as many or more than the official data declared by Macedonian authorities. They who have it difficult to understand this reality should refer to information by the Slavic authors themselves, both Serbian and Macedonian.

10 Former Politburo Members To Go on Trial

AU0212221193 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Article 107 of the Penal Code will charge 10 of the former blockmen [former politburo members living in an elite quarter] of Enver Hoxha's regime at a trial against them, which is going to be held on Friday, 10 December.

The following defendants: Pali Miska, Foto Cami, Lenka Cuko, LLambi Gegprifti, Qirjako Mihali, Prokop Murra, Muho Asllani, Vangjel Cerrava, and Hajredin Celiku will face the judicial body chaired by the court deputy chairman Artan Zeneli.

As Mr. Zeneli told the radio reporter Rezear Xhaxhiu, they are charged with violation of the citizens' equality and the creation of privileges and national inequality.

According to this article, when the offense does not constitute a crime against the state, it is punished with ten years imprisonment.

'No Radiation Contamination' From Kozloduy Fire

AU0212165493 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] In connection with the report on a fire breaking out at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, at 1720 we established telephone contact with Dyanko Dobrev, director general of the National Electricity Company. This is what he said:

[Begin Dobrev recording] Regarding the report of the fire at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, with a risk of radioactive discharges, the latest information that we received 10 minutes ago is that bales of old unusable working overalls, which following sorting and decontamination are baled and stored in a room for lightly contaminated waste, started to smolder, following which they were hosed down with water, and that no—how should I put it?—no radiation contamination or fires exist. [end recording]

IAEA Detectors Show No Change

AU0212185293 Sofia BTA in English 1803 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Excerpts] Sofia, December 2 (BTA)—A fire broke out in two shafts deep 18 metres in the special blocks of Units Five and Six of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant at 1128 AM today, BTA learned from the Interior Ministry press office. [passage omitted]

Speaking exclusively to BTA, Yordanka Stoyanova, the Kozloduy plant's chief public relations officer, said: "The clothes, made of polymers, burnt with thick smoke. The depot where they are stored is not connected with the equipment of the reactor unit and the plant's safety. Background radiation remains unchanged."

Captain Todor Gotsev of the regional fire service in Vratsa told BTA the fire probably broke out after continued smouldering and self-ignition. The shafts are made of concrete and there is no danger of a spread of the fire or an increase in background radiation. Sensors in the N-plant have not registered such an increase. Firemen are keeping the shafts under observation.

The readings of detectors installed by the International Atomic Energy Agency confirm there are no changes in background radiation.

Miners Strike 'Gaining Momentum'; Talks Continue

AU0212202293 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] At its regular meeting today, after discussing various alternatives, the cabinet decided to postpone until next week the adoption of regulatory decisions relating to restructuring the ore mining industry and providing the funds needed by the mines and pits for the period until the end of the year.

We will find out tomorrow how the striking miners will react to this piece of news, but today we continue to follow developments in the miners strike. Here is a report from our correspondent Georgi Radev in Smolyan:

[Begin Radev recording] Today 100 percent of the miners employed at the company's branch in the town of Luki joined the strike protest. Miners at the Druzhba, Gyurkovo, and (Tetrovka) mines came out on an indefinite strike. At the Gyurkovo mine the 20 miners called off their hunger strike but remained underground. Workers at the factory in the town are also on strike.

In the Madan branch, mine workers at all four mines stopped work for one hour. Miners and ore-dressers in Rudozem also took strike actions, while the miners at the Shakhonitsa Pit in the same division have called a two-day strike. So far miners in the Zlatograd branch have not taken strike action.

According to the assessment of Adem Dilyanov, deputy chairman of the strike committee in Gorubso, the strike is gaining momentum. [end recording]

According to the information of the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria], throughout the country 9,800 miners downed tools today for one hour, while 1,000 went on strike all day.

At a joint meeting at the Council of Ministers, two subcommissions of the National Council for Trilateral Cooperation discussed the miners' basic demands and reached agreement that they would submit to the National Council a draft document on changes in Council of Ministers Decree No. 140 on Restructuring the Mining Industry, in the drafting of which the trade unions took part. The draft document resolves some of the problems connected with the programs for alternative employment. The question of the unpaid wages for 1993 will be examined by the National Council for Trilateral Cooperation at its meeting next Tuesday [7 December].

More Collectives Joining

AU0312120293 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 3 Dec 93

[Text] The miners of the Fifth Gorubso branch in Luki stopped work today. The miners of the Cheloyad mine are also on full day strike. The same applies to the workers of the Kurdzhali ore enrichment plant. The rest of the miners are on warning strike, interrupting their work for one hour per shift.

Sasho Sariev, chairman of the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria] Miners' Federation and chairman of the strike committee in Luki, announced that seven of the 20 miners in the Gyurkovo mine who remained on strike underground, have left the pit because of their deteriorating state of health. The others are pursuing their two-days protest actions.

The workers of the local ore enrichment plant in Luki, the workers of the motor vehicles pool, and the engineering-technical personnel of the mining branch joined their colleagues' strike today.

The strike committee announced that the protest actions shall continue as long as all demands of the miners have not been fulfilled.

Deutsche Bank: Debt Settlement 'Not Concluded'

AU0212210593 Sofia BTA in English 1818 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Excerpt] Sofia, December 2 (BTA)—The matter of Bulgaria's foreign debt has not yet been concluded, a senior Deutsche Bank official told the German-language newspaper WIRTSCHAFTSBLATT, published in Sofia. Deutsche Bank confirms the sides made great progress at the negotiations, amazing to itself, as initial positions differed dramatically, with Bulgaria insisting on reducing the debt by two-thirds and Deutsche Bank on a 38 percent write-off. The sides met "halfway." Yet Deutsche Bank thinks it is too early to announce final debt-reduction figures, recalling that many details of the agreement are still to be specified. [passage omitted]

Bulgarian-Greek Cooperation Commission Opens

AU0212210693 Sofia BTA in English 1924 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Sofia, December 2 (BTA)—A two-day session of the Bulgarian-Greek mixed Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation opened in Sofia today. The topics for discussion are cooperation in the economic, social and investment areas and expansion of trade contacts.

The Greek delegation, headed by Ioannis Papandoniou, second minister of national economy and chairman of the Greek side of the commission, includes financial, industrial, trade and economic representatives. Today it met with the chairman of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Tomorrow Mr. Papandoniou is expected to be received by Prime Minister Lyuben Berov and the ministers of trade, industry and finance. Businessmen from the two countries will meet at a Bulgarian-Greek business forum starting tomorrow as part of the official meetings. It is organized by the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Greek trade mission to this country.

Transport Minister Kiril Ermenkov is chairman of the Bulgarian side of the commission. Several agreements and a protocol on the results of the session will be signed tomorrow.

This is the 16th session of the commission, set up in November 1972. Sessions are generally held annually.

Commentary: Russia Has 'No Right To Interfere'

AU0312113393 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 2 Dec 93 p 9

[Viliam Buchert and Lubos Palata commentary: "Russia Cannot Dictate Conditions in Central Europe"]

[Text] U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared in May 1944 that he did "not care whether the countries bordering Russia become communist." The consequences of this, lasting several decades, for the states of Central and Eastern Europe and for the global security situation are well known.

For this reason, Russian reservations (whether they involve Yeltsin's letter to the representatives of Western countries or the recent statement made by the head of Russian intelligence, Primakov) against the possible expansion of NATO to include the countries of the former Soviet bloc meet with displeasure and an unwillingness to listen.

Following their experiences with the Soviet aggressor—which often used the most brutal means (Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) to keep its empire in line—the idea that Russia could make decisions on guaranteeing security and stability in our region is currently unacceptable to the countries of Central Europe.

After an upsurge of democracy had brought the totalitarian Eastern European regimes to their knees and the USSR had collapsed, Russia lost its sphere of influence. Of course, as far as the peoples in Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, it is objectionable that its future sphere of influence should evolve here. It is even being said in diplomatic circles that Moscow is endeavoring to introduce a new, but this time "veiled Brezhnev doctrine."

Moscow is also trying—not without success—to become NATO's main partner and to place the Central and Eastern European states into the position of midget countries, which would either be jointly administered or divided between the West and the Russian East. They would, as the case may be, become an item in this bargaining over spheres of interest that Russia could exchange for something or—vice versa—could gain in return for concessions in other areas.

In his letter, Yeltsin deliberately refers to the fact that there is no cooperation on a security basis among Moscow's former vassals. These words should act as a challenge to our states at least to consider whether there is indeed a possibility of cooperation in this sphere.

By distancing themselves from somewhat inscrutable Ukraine and the problematic Baltic region and also by forgetting about the other post-Soviet countries—which are, after all, merely trying to get themselves out of Russia's sphere of influence—the Central European countries are eliminating their possibilities for maneuver. By not creating our own initiatives, we are—in essence—placing ourselves at the mercy of NATO leaders and are in fact proving Russia right when it says to them, Central Europe is not a partner for you, talk to us, we are your partner.

The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and also Slovakia would like to become affiliated to NATO. Russia is opposed to this and claims that it should be first and then, perhaps, us next. Security cooperation between the post-communist countries would be the best counter-move for ensuring that we are not excluded from the game. Naturally, this must go hand in hand with improving our defense capability and with our involvement in resolving possible European ethnic or local conflicts.

Russia has no right to interfere in the affairs of Central Europe. This also concerns our membership in NATO. If it attempts to do this, the response should be a coordinated course of action on the part of all the states in our region.

BIS Report Lists Foreign Services in Republic

AU0212145793 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 25 Nov 93 p 1

[Ferdinand Peroutka report: "BIS Information Testifies to the Threat of Foreign Terrorism in the Czech Republic"]

[Text] According to unofficial sources, the classified part of the BIS [Security and Information Service] report submitted to the Czech Parliament contains information about the Russian secret service SUPR [expansion unknown] (the former 1st Administration of KGB) and the Russian Military intelligence GRU operating on the territory of the Czech Republic. Furthermore, two German intelligence services—the BND [Federal Intelligence Service] and the BGS [Federal Border Police]—allegedly operate here.

The Chinese Ministry for State Security is also interested in all spheres of our life. Therefore, the BIS follows the movement of persons of Asian origin and gathers information about the organization of illegal migration from Asia. A growth of the Chinese community and richness of its members based on illegal migration is to be expected. The strengthening of its economic influence, participation in trafficking capital, and laundering money are also foreseen. The BIS is also involved in monitoring activities of foreign agencies in refugee camps in the Czech Republic.

The report on the operation of the BIS also indicates that, in the foreseeable future, the Czech Republic may become an operational space for interest groups of international terrorism. So far, the BIS has not observed any immediate signals of prepared terrorist actions against Czech citizens, foreign residents, or facilities on the territory of the Czech Republic. Among the groups with an implicit danger of terrorism are certain militant Palestinian organizations. A suspicion in this respect has been evoked particularly by anonymous threats to the Israeli representative mission and requests from certain Arab embassies for reinforcement of protection against

terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, an evidence of actual presence of fundamentalist terrorist groups of the Hizballah type has not been found in the Czech Republic. In connection with the activities of the terrorist groups, the BIS operative units collect information on arms, military material, and the drug trade. They also process data on all forms of politically or non-politically motivated extremism and the so-called internal terrorism. This applies mostly to fascist and neofascist groups and anarchist movements. The contacts of these groups with similar groups abroad are also monitored. In the future, attempts at violence by these groups oriented against politically left-oriented persons cannot be ruled out. Because of the insufficient funding of the extremist groups, the possibility exists of their exploitation by various Mafias.

Uhde Views Talks With Bundestag President

AU0212203293 Prague CTK in English 2243 GMT 1 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 1 (CTK)—Milan Uhde said tonight that he had rejected Bundestag President Rita Sussmuth's proposal to discuss all sore points of Czech-German relations on the parliamentary level because it was not possible to talk on the level about a matter that is clear, which means compensation for the victims of Nazism, or about the claims of Sudeten Germans who want to correct World War Two results.

Uhde, chairman of Czech Parliament, was interviewed by the Czech television station CT-2 on his talks with Sussmuth during his visit to Germany on Monday [29 November] and Tuesday [1 December].

Sussmuth told journalists after her talks with Czech parliamentarians on Monday that she believed that the parliaments should discuss the two problems. If the two wrongs are fully separated, understanding will never be attained, she said.

About 2.5 Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War Two under the decrees issued by President Edvard Benes in 1945 and their property was expropriated. They now claim restitution of the property and recognition of their right to homeland.

Some 13,000 Czech political prisoners of World War Two, their widows or orphans demand compensation from Germany.

Uhde told journalists on Monday that in his talks with Sussmuth he refused to conduct negotiations on the Sudeten German question because the Czech Republic considered it closed.

The Sudeten German question is a topic for talks between private persons, Uhde said at a press conference in Bonn and added that they were not a topic for talks between politicians or deputies.

Uhde told the television that the Czech ambassador to Germany, Jiri Grusa, had informed him that Sussmuth was not at all satisfied with the presentation of her stand in Czech papers, and demanded a correction to be published.

According to the German news agency DPA, Sussmuth today dismissed as complete distortion of her statements the words which had been allegedly ascribed to her and which have provoked dissatisfaction in Czech Parliament.

Slovakia Border To Become Standard by Mar 1994

AU0212221293 Prague CTK in English 2122 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Lanzhot, South Moravia, Dec 2 (CTK)—Interior Minister Jan Ruml said today that the Czech Republic could introduce a standard border regime on the Czech-Slovak border by March 31 next year. He said that in all 900 policemen would be employed along the border and that trains would be routinely inspected too. No soldiers will operate on the border.

Speaking at a press conference he said that Slovakia had no plans to introduce a similar regime but did recognize the Czech Republic's fears that without one it would be hard to cope with negative phenomena such as crime, emigration and drug dealing.

Ruml said that he was to meet his Slovak counterpart Jozef Tuchyna on December 15 to discuss bilateral agreements on the arrangements at the border crossings and on speeding up customs clearance procedure at the border.

As soon as we sign the agreements with Slovakia, the provisional buildings will be replaced by permanent buildings constructed jointly, Ruml said. Police departments responsible for the various border districts are slowly being established already, he said, and the process would be complete by the end of march.

The ministers are initially contemplating "small" border contact to a depth of 25 kilometers on either side of the border open only to people who can prove that they live in the area permanently. Other citizens will only be able to cross at prescribed points with a passport, he said.

Libya Sanctions Affect Czech Citizens

AU0212221893 Prague CTK in English 2011 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 2 (CTK)—The harsher UN sanctions against Libya, in force since Wednesday [1 December], will have a distinct effect on Czech nationals working in Libya, Jana Hybaskova, a Czech Foreign Ministry official told CTK today. The Czech Government decided that the country would join sanctions on Wednesday.

These people, numbering 200 to 300 and employed mostly in health and construction sectors, will have serious difficulties getting home after their contracts expire, Hybaskova stated. The Czech Republic's claims to Libya amount to several hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, she reported.

The Czech nationals who work for Libyan companies are paid partly in Libyan dinars and part of their earnings is deposited in U.S. dollars in the foreign accounts.

The contracts they concluded with the companies provide only for return air tickets with the Libyan Arab Airlines. The harsher UN sanctions banned any international flights of this company and any manipulations with its air tickets.

The Czechs are not able to buy air tickets with other companies, since the UN sanctions banned their sale in Libya, Hybaskova stressed. Neither can they withdraw their money from their dollar accounts, she added.

The only option is to change the Libyan dinars at an unfavorable exchange rate at the black market and to surmount somehow the one-thousand-kilometer distance to Tunis, where they would have to buy the return air ticket with their own savings, which is rather complicated, Hybaskova said.

Nationals of other countries—with the notable exception of other post-communist countries—have secured their air tickets with other airlines, Hybaskova said.

The Foreign Ministry will provide the Czech nationals every possible help, but only technical, not political assistance can be considered, she added.

Cost of Living Expected To Increase in 1994

AU0112164693 Prague CTK in English 2206 GMT 30 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 30 (CTK)—Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus today said that the government draft budget for next year was not lacking means for the cost-of-living adjustment of pensions and social grants related to the sustenance level.

Speaking to journalists after today's ministerial meeting, Klaus said that in case of an "unforeseeable" situation, problems could be settled within the proposed budget. In case of the unforeseeable situation, living costs and the sustenance level would not reach the "threshold for a cost-of-living adjustment" until towards the end of next year and the necessary means for paying out higher pensions for one of two months would be found in the budget.

Last week the ministers agreed to raise the sustenance level by 10 percent as of February 1, 1994. The sustenance level is to be raised in connection with the rise in living costs, expected after January 1, 1994 when rents in apartments will go up by 40 percent and the prices of district heating will rise as well.

Economics Minister Karel Dyba said the present sustenance level for an individual was 1,960 crowns (about $66) and after the rise it would be 2,160 crowns. The ministers' decision is yet to be approved by government.

The ministers proposed the adjustment of the sustenance level in accord with a legal regulation under which the government has to discuss and propose a sustenance level increase if living costs grow by ten percent.

Wages grew slower as against rising prices by three percentage points in the third quarter of the year, compared with the second quarter, according to estimates of the Czech Statistics Office. Klaus said the intended effect of wage regulation, introduced on July 1, was thus coming about.

In the second quarter wages grew by 28.1 percent and prices by 21.8 percent, as against the comparable period of last year, which means a 6.3 point difference. In the third quarter of the year wages grew by 24.5 percent and prices by 21.2 percent, the difference between the growth of wages and rise in prices being 3.3 percentage points.

Rather than agreeing to an increase in the salaries of ministers, deputies and other constitutional officials being dependent on a rise in the salaries of other constitutional officials, the government would refrain from any increase in all salaries, including those of ministers, Klaus said after the ministerial meeting.

Constitutional officials are members of government, the president and vice-presidents of the Supreme Inspection Office and parliamentary members.

Klaus rejected claims that by proposing a 24-percent rise in the salaries of government members, the president and vice-presidents of the Supreme Inspection Office, which was incorporated in the 1994 draft budget bill, the government had failed to keep to a gentleman's agreement, according to which pay raises would apply to all constitutional officials or none.

The government is so much afraid of the indexing method in the system of wages and salaries that it will refrain from any rise in all salaries, including its own, Klaus said.

Parliament Passes Amendment to Tax Law

AU0212165093 Prague CTK in English 1144 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 2 (CTK)—The Czech Parliament today passed an amendment to the law on inheritance taxes, gift taxes and property transfer taxes.

The most fundamental change to the law was the introduction of a single five-percent tax rate for all taxpayers on the transfer of property. The old law set the rate at one to 20 percent, dividing taxpayers into three groups according to their relation to the transfer.

According to the law, the basis for the property transfer tax is the value of the property, determined according to the price regulation valid on the day possession of the property is taken. The amendment allows the basis to be set by agreement or contract, as long as this market price is higher than the determined value.

The government model proposed a certain increase in the rate progression for inheritance and gift taxes,

according to which close relatives would be taxed at one to seven percent of the value of the inherited or given property, secondary relatives at three to 15 percent and other taxpayers at seven to 50 percent.

The parliament passed the proposal from Richard Mandelik (Civic Democratic Party-ODS), which lowers the rate of inheritance taxes by half for all groups. This proposal does not affect the rates for gift taxes, which remain as they were proposed by the government.

According to the government, its proposal is based on the necessity of supporting the property market and introducing rates similar to those in force in European Community countries.

IMF Chairman Grateful for Aid Contribution

AU0212181793 Prague CTK in English 1246 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 2 (CTK)—International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Director Michel Camdessus has thanked Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus for the positive position of the Czech Republic towards providing financial aid for the ESAF (Enhanced Structure Adjustment Facility) Trust, government spokeswoman Klara Pospisilova told CTK today.

The government approved the aid at its session on Wednesday [1 November].

Pospisilova said that the Czech Republic was the first of the countries with transforming economies to contribute to the IMF. From an international point of view, she said, this is considered one of the indications of the success of reforms in a country.

The Czech Republic will contribute 41.3 million crowns ($1.4 million) annually for 10 years to the IMF within the framework of the facility ESAF II programme, which is aimed at providing concession loans to the 71 poorest countries in the world.

Government Approves Refugee Quotas for 1994

AU0212221493 Prague CTK in English 2045 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Lanzhot, South Moravia, Dec 2 (CTK)—The Czech Government has approved a quota of 1,000 persons for refugee status, and 2,000 places in temporary asylum in the Interior Ministry's humanitarian facilities for 1994, Czech Interior Minister Jan Ruml told journalists today.

Moreover, some 2,000 nationals of former Yugoslavia are placed in Czech families. These figures cannot threaten the Czech Republic and will not cause any problems with security, Ruml said.

He mentioned that some 150,000 former Yugoslav nationals lived in Austria and the figure for Germany was more than half a million.

Jezek on Compensation for Nazi's Prisoners

AU0212221693 Prague CTK in English 2059 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 2 (CTK)—The funds needed for the compensation of the Czech political prisoners from the period of Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia (1939-45) will be drawn either from the state budget or one of the two state-owned restitution funds, of the National Property Fund [FNM], Tomas Jezek said today.

Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec has asked Jezek, FNM chairman, to delegate a FNM representative to participate in a working group to solve the question of funding the compensation.

The government intends to compensate the citizens concerned in advance, before the question is settled between the Czech Republic and Germany. Zieleniec has been pushing for such a compensation in view of the advanced age of those involved, stressing that he views it both as moral and financial act. According to Zieleniec, the compensation must not be viewed as the Czech Republic's taking over commitments of the defeated power (Germany), but the effort to help people whose age does not allow any further delay.

The state budget for 1994 has already been closed, and the FNM has no spare funds, Jezek said. Nevertheless some chances exist regarding the issue, he added.

Jezek said that the compensation can be covered from the FNM's Restitution Fund I, destined to grant compensation to those claiming it under the law on extrajudicial rehabilitation, or from the Restitution Fund II, meant to cover financial claims following from land law. Both these funds are likely to enable in some way their being used for this purpose, Jezek stated.

Another possibility is the compensation's funding from FNM profit in 1995, Jezek added.

Government Approves 1994 State Budget

LD0212231893 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] The Slovak Government today approved a draft state budget for next year. The budget as envisiaged has a deficit of 14 billion Slovak koruny. It maintains a maximum inflation rate of 12 percent; an unemployment ceiling of 17 percent; and a GDP growth rate of zero percent. Following the government's meeting Finance Minister Julius Toth said that versus the draft variant of the state budget previously examined there were only minor changes made to individual departments. These were carried out on the basis of demands made by the coalition partner, the Slovak National Party (SNP), and concerning the ministries of culture, environment, and science—where an increase was envisaged. The government was unable to meet the demand made by the SNP to increase financial subsidies on education, given unavoidable restrictive measures concerning all departments except for defense.

Filkus: ASD To Vote Against Draft Budget

AU0212182193 Prague CTK in English 1546 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 2 (CTK)—A wave of budget populism is under way in Slovakia, deputy chairman of the Alliance of Slovak Democrats (ASD, eight deputies in the 150-seat Slovak Parliament) Rudolf Filkus told journalists today.

This is evidenced by several HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) representatives claiming that only those who want to ruin the country will not support the budget.

Filkus, a leading Slovak economist, was the last Czechoslovak deputy premier for the HZDS. After his dispute with the HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar he was appointed Slovak Ambassador to Austria in March 1993. In September, he resigned from the HZDS, and joined the ASD, founded by another HZDS dissident Milan Knazko, in November.

Filkus said that such statements were unfounded and out of place. He noted that the ASD would not support the draft budget in the form the government presented it.

People learn about budget cuts and are even afraid of hospital closures. They get detailed information on the budget expenditures, but no information on the revenues, Filkus said.

Foreign Minister on Results of CSCE Meeting

LD0212180093 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Interview with Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik by editor Jan Baranek in Bratislava on 2 December—recorded]

[Excerpts] Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik returned from the Rome session of the CSCE Council yesterday. Editor Jan Baranek met him in Bratislava this morning and asked him to assess the Rome talks:

[Baranek] Minister, you have returned from Rome. Could you tell us which of the conclusions of the CSCE Council session is the most interesting and most important for Slovakia?

[Moravcik] As to the conclusions from the CSCE, one has to say that no agreement has been reached on the questions that were discussed most. This means that the entire matter has been transferred to the Committee of High Commissioners, that means that the work on the entire document will continue. What is involved is, above all, peacekeeping and the role that the Russian federation should play in peacekeeping. These questions have remained open.

Out of what has been accepted, I do not consider important [as heard] further work connected with improving the efficiency of the entire CSCE mechanism, i.e., it has been confirmed that it is important to improve the function of the CSCE, to improve the function of the entire mechanism, to strengthen the trend leading toward creating an international organization on the principles of the CSCE. For us, the conclusions that have been accepted in connection with the human dimension, above all the role of the High Commissioner for National Minorities, are important. It is where we see very good areas for cooperation and for promoting our interests in the foreign policy sphere, above all as to protection of minorities.

Likewise, the significance of the economic dimension has been confirmed, that means expanding cooperation in the economy sphere. We might consider that an important decision from the point of view of our interests.

[Baranek] In your address in Rome you talked about a multiethnic coexistence in the new spirit in Europe. Could you explain what you mean under the notion of new spirit?

[Moravcik] Well, above all, our idea is that principles of organizing society on the basis of individual rights should develop, so that pan-European space for implementing the intrinsic identity of every people and every nationality might be truly created. [passage omitted]

[Baranek] During your stay in Rome, you conducted some bilateral talks. Could you tell us with whom and about what?

[Moravcik] It is a tradition that Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec and I arrange to meet when taking part in these forums. We told each other what had been done since our previous meeting and how we intended to proceed, in particular with some unclarified issues on the control of the border between the two republics. We also

discussed security, and coordination of mutual proceedings on European security issues.

The talks with van der Broek [EC commissioner for foreign and security policy] and van den Stoel, [CSCE] high commissioner for national minorities were very important. We analyzed the activity of the mission of experts [organized by] the high commissioner for national minorities and its conclusions. They are very favorable for us. This confirms the realism of our foreign political objectives in this area. We spoke about preparations for further work of the experts in Slovakia. A similar mission is (?to work or already working) in the Hungarian Republic.

[Baranek] Finally, let us speak about wider political issues. What is the attitude of Ukraine to the pressure from superpowers to eliminate its nuclear potential—at least as you could see it in Rome?

[Moravcik] I was pleased by the Mr. Zlenko's [Ukraine's foreign minister] statement with which I had acquainted myself only after my departure from Rome. The Ukrainian Government expressed a willingness to meet the policy on this halfway. This, I think, is also a positive sign for our cooperation with this important neighbor of ours.

President Reportedly Called on Meciar To Resign

AU0212163793 Prague CTK in English 1401 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Kosice, East Slovakia, Dec 2 (CTK)—At a meeting with functionaries of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) last weekend, Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar said that President Michal Kovac had called on him to resign, the Slovak Daily SLOVENSKY VYCHOD writes today.

But I cannot offer my resignation, as a new coalition government would then have to be formed and ministerial posts would have to be filled. It is not an appropriate time for the radical transformation of the government, the daily quotes Meciar as saying.

The paper dedicates the whole page to the text of Meciar's speech, transcribed from a tape recording which the editorial office found on the editorial table. Deputy editor-in-chief Tibor Ferko told CTK that the record was authentic. We would not allow ourselves to take risks, we have the material in order, he said.

If the HZDS had to go into early elections, it would be so strong that it would hammer the opposition, Meciar said in the transcript, adding that the other members of the government were decided that we will hammer them. We will go for it in a way that will surprise them all. We are being quiet at the moment, creating a calming impression on people abroad, and not playing the highest trump cards at home in order to calm down people abroad. When they calm down, it will be another situation, the paper quotes Meciar as saying in the transcript.

Referring to local elections which are to be called in Slovakia next autumn, Meciar said that the HZDS would give one million Slovak crowns to each region and even two million to Kosice. He said he supposed that HZDS members were already at the head of the state administrative bodies in all regions, and that was why expert services of the state administration could be used in preparing local elections.

Meciar said he was convinced that part of the church hierarchy would also support the HZDS. It should not be drawn into politics, but it creates the public opinion and it is capable of appreciating, Meciar said, adding that for three weeks already services for the government had been conducted in Slovakia. Everywhere bishops address believers with the words that the government is made by God and should be respected. God let it remain, Meciar said.

Meciar said that the cultural organization Matice Slovenska has unambiguously supported the HZDS and announced that it would never and nowhere support anybody except the HZDS. He said that at least half of all unionists would support the movement. Among other organizations which are close to the HZDS Meciar named the Democratic Women's Union, the Union of Slovak Writers, the Association of Slovak Intelligentsia Korene (ROOTS) and the Green Party in Slovakia.

Meciar said that he had asked Slovak National Bank Governor Marian Tkac to voluntarily offer his resignation and not to be a disgrace to us there. If Tkac does not do this the premier is determined to propose his resignation to the government and parliament.

Meciar said that under the coalition agreement with the Slovak National Party (SNS), the HZDS will propose the resignation of Slovak Prosecutor General Vojtech Bach and that the SNS will support the proposal in parliament. He said the HZDS had already chosen a candidate who is close to the movement. He voiced the supposition that the new prosecutor general would start doing what he should do because several cases have been currently frozen in the prosecutor's office and nothing is being done with them.

Meciar described as a historic mistake parliament's passage a no-confidence vote in Slovak Health Minister Viliam Sobona. He said Sobona should have completed the work with the national insurance office and then left. Referring to the vote on Sobona in parliament when the coalition HZDS-SNS was outvoted, Meciar said that the government ought to effectively count on the repetition of such a situation because otherwise it could fall anytime, he warned.

On the media, Meciar said that Roman Zelenay (HZDS deputy chairman and state secretary in the Cultural Ministry), before his death, gave him a list with 40 names of journalists who according to his information allegedly received from $200 to $1,200 per month for writing against the government. Meciar said that all these people were renowned moderators from radio,

television and newspapers. He added that investigation was currently underway to find out whether the allegations were true. If they prove true then we will make the list public, he said.

Meciar said that it was agreed with the management of Slovak Radio and the Radio Council that they would not resign for the time being. We are choosing a director for television, he said, adding that after he gained support, a director who is close to HZDS would be appointed.

Ferko informed CTK that the daily was preparing to publish part of Meciar's speech in Zlata Idka concerning the economic situation in Slovakia for next week.

Lexa Criticizes Prosecutor for Proceedings

AU0212162493 Prague CTK in English 2120 GMT 1 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 1 (CTK)—The Slovak prosecutor general Vojtech Bacho has not yet investigated any cases of illicit practice in privatization which the Privatization Ministry sent him, State Secretary for the Ministry Ivan Lexa said today.

Bacho had not reacted to any documents provided by the government, while it had taken him only a few hours to instigate proceedings against Lexa for defamation of the president, Lexa claimed at a meeting of the main coalition party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS).

HZDS chairman and Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar has made no secret of his desire to dismiss Bacho.

Lexa disputed committing any offense and added that everybody was allowed to say what they thought. I am not calling into question the president's decision, because he's entitled to it, but the manner in which he made it, Lexa said. He was referring to President Michal Kovac's statement doubting Lexa was morally fit to assume the function of privatization minister.

When the embattled HZDS formed a coalition with the Slovak National Party (SNS), Kovac twice refused to name Lexa minister of privatization.

In response Lexa told reporters that Kovac had not been able to justify his objections to Lexa. He said that he had never kowtowed to Meciar and never behaved like some former communists who these days conspicuously spend their weekends in churches. This was judged to be an allusion to Kovac, who was a Communist Party member until 1969 and the prosecutor general launched proceedings for defamation of the president.

SDL Chairman: Party Ready To Assume Power

AU0212145193 Prague CTK in English 2114 GMT 1 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 1 (CTK)—The Democratic Left Party (SDL) is able to create a new and better Slovak Government immediately, the SDL chairman Peter Weiss told CTK today. The party has a comprehensive programme and it is capable of creating a new and better Slovak Government, Weiss added.

The SDL, which has 28 deputies in the 150-seat Slovak Parliament, surpassed the governing Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in the October poll with 17 percent of voters' trust, against 15 per cent of the HZDS. The HZDS won the June 1992 elections with 37 percent of the vote.

We believe that at present we are capable of placing better, well-prepared people for the governmental posts. We are better than the HZDS, which we do not deem the most important thing. The main thing is to be able to tackle problems Slovakia is facing, Weiss said.

Slovakia's path is so narrow that the classical notions of right and left are blurred, as the decisive quality is expertise and the ability to analyze and solve the accumulated problems, and to forecast future development, he stated.

We are interested in the accelerated process of definition, Weiss said on the development on the Slovak political scene and within the HZDS. He suggested that the process could accelerate in a few months, if not weeks.

Several deputies have splintered from the HZDS and, according to some analysts, some more are to follow. The SDL is preparing, therefore, for possible early elections which it has demanded since the beginning of the year, Weiss said.

In that case, a broad coalition which would include all the political forces from left of the center to right of the center could not be ruled out, Weiss said.

Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the opposition Slovak Christian Democratic Union (KDU) said on November 18 that he did not rule out a tactical union with the SDL under certain conditions and in the interest of Slovakia's salvation.

Poll Surveys Degree of Support for Parties

AU0212193593 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 1 Dec 93 p 3

[Report by Martin Krno: "The Government Coalition Is Losing Sympathizers"]

[Text] Slovak Radio's Institute of Methodological Research carried out a public opinion survey from 12 to 15 November 1993, using the Gallup method. One of the questions was: "Imagine that new parliamentary elections were to be held this week. For which party or movement would you opt?" The sample of 1,300 citizens of the Slovak Republic above 18 guarantees the representativeness of the poll and confirms the trend of electoral preferences that has been evident for several months: the virtually free fall of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] to 16 percent and the stability, or slight increase [of support] for the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] (14.9 percent). Support for the Slovak National Party [SNS] has declined to 5.9 percent, apparently as a result of its flirting with the idea of a

marriage with the unsuccessful ruling movement, while the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] has gained supporters (9.8 percent). Of the other political parties, the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia [SDSS] was the only one to reach more than 2 percent, if we leave aside the Hungarian coalition, whose members figured separately in this survey—the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] achieved 1.9 percent and the Coexistence Movement 1.3 percent.

Once again, the greatest number of respondents belonged to two categories—those who would not go to the polls (16.5 percent) or those who do not know, or do not want to reply (23.6 percent). Due to these voters, the representation of individual political forces in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] would undergo significant changes, according to estimates. With 48 seats, the HZDS would be ahead by a half a head of the SDL with 45 seats (after the elections the HZDS had 74 seats, now, after Milan Knazko and his seven supporters set up the Club of Independent Deputies, it has 66 deputies; while the SDL now has 28 representatives in parliament, following Ivan Hudec's departure from its club of deputies). The SDL would be followed by the KDH with 30 seats (18 at present), the SNS with 17 seats (compared with 14 at present because "independent" deputy P. Brnak, according to his own statements, represents in the NRSR the interests of the Christian Social Union), and the Coexistence/MKDH Hungarian coalition with 10 seats (compared with 14 at present). As we learned at yesterday's SDL briefing, SDL First Deputy Chairman Pavol Kanis assumes that the next elections will be contested in electoral blocs. If he is right, the results of the next elections could be significantly determined, apart from the outcome of the battle for the votes of undecided voters, by the patching up of pre-election coalitions. In political arithmetics, one and one is not always two.

Electoral Preferences, November 1993 (in percent)	
HZDS	16.0
SDL	14.9
KDH	9.8
SNS	5.9
SDSS	2.0
MKDH	1.9
Alliance of Democrats	1.4
Coexistence	1.3
Entrepreneurs	1.3
Greens	1.3
Democratic Party	1.1
Conservative Democratic Party	1.0
Christian Social Union	0.6
Other parties	1.1
Do not know	23.6
Will not vote	16.5

Estimated Distribution of Seats in the National Assembly	
HZDS	48
SDL	45
KDH	30
SNS	17
Hungarian parties	10

HZDS Support Declining

AU0212193793 Bratislava SME in Slovak 1 Dec 93 p 2

["(ll)"-signed report: "The Party of the Democratic Left Is Trusted Most"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] is currently the most trustworthy entity on our domestic political scene. This is apparent from a poll conducted by Slovak Radio's Institute of Methodological Research among 1,192 respondents on 12-15 November 1993. The tables published below are based on an analysis of the following question: Have you altered your opinion recently (six months to a year) on the following political parties and movements? The respondents were able to choose from these options:

1. I trust it and I continue to trust it;

2. I trusted it, but do not trust it now;

3. I did not trust it, but I do now;

4. I did not trust it and I do not trust it now.

The results depicted in the first table are a summary of the positive responses to the first and third options. The other table depicts gain or loss of trust. It is obvious from the results that the current coalition partners—the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Slovak National Party [SNS]—have suffered the greatest loss of trust.

Trust in Political Entities (in percent)	
SDL	31.0
SNS	29.4
HZDS	26.9
Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]	20.1
Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS]	16.9
Democratic Party [DS]	10.1
Entrepreneurs [SP]	7.6
Alliance of Democrats [AD SR]	7.5
Christian Social Union [KSU]	6.4
Coexistence	5.6
Hungarian KDH [MKDH]	5.2
Conservative Democratic Party [SKD]	4.9

Changes in Trust in Political Entities (in percent)		
	Loss of Trust	Gain in Trust
Coexistence	2.6	0.8
HZDS	31.8	2.2
KDH	19.5	5.1
SNS	24.5	7.7
SDL	11.0	9.5
MKDH	2.5	1.0
SDSS	8.1	5.6
AD SR	2.5	3.7
DS	8.1	2.3
SKD	2.2	2.2
KSU	3.7	3.0
SP	2.9	1.9

KDH: Meciar Exerts 'Dangerous Pressure' on Media

AU0212191093 Prague CTK in English 1412 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 2 (CTK)—Deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Party (KDH) Ivan Simko said that Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar's announcement Wednesday [1 December] that he had been given a list of 40 journalists suspected of being paid in dollars for anti-government writing placed dangerous pressure on the freedom of the press.

At a rally of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) yesterday, Meciar said that if the suspicion was confirmed the names of the journalists would be made public. Meciar said the journalists lacked "fundamental respect" and that the behavior of the opposition media was crossing the borders of decency and law.

The freedom of the press is one of the fundamental values of a free society, Simko said.

KDH chairman Jan Carnogursky pointed to information carried by the German daily FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG Wednesday that the Consultative Assembly of the Western European Union [WEU] had recommended to the Council of Ministers to reconsider the possibility of cooperation with the Slovak Republic in the framework of the WEU Consultative Forum. Carnogursky said he believed that it was the first time Slovakia had been formally selected as a problematic country.

Gasparovic Receives Slovak Group From Hungary

AU0212154493 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 1 Dec 93 p 2

[TA SR report: "A Phenomenon of Fear of Resettlement?"]

[Text] Casta-Papiernicka—In Casta-Papiernicka yesterday Slovak Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic received representatives of the Union of Slovaks in Hungary led by its acting chairman, Michal Matto.

The Slovaks from Hungary briefed the parliamentary chairman on the rights of the minorities in Hungary and on the Union's activity. Among other things, they mentioned the inadequate flow of information and requested assistance in creating the conditions for receiving Slovak Television Channels 1 and 2. They also showed an interest in other forms of cooperation, especially in the cultural and social science spheres. Gasparovic promised our compatriots broad assistance. However, he stressed that it will be quite restricted owing to the financial restraints in the Slovak Republic.

The Union's representatives told reporters at a press briefing held after their reception that nationalist pressures have been increasing recently in Hungary. A new phenomenon has cropped up—fear of resettlement, which should apparently take place so that the "ethnically repressed Hungarians" can return from Slovakia to their old homeland.

Mayor Denies NEW YORK TIMES Article

AU0212133493 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Nov 93 p 1

["(jc)"-signed report: "The Mayor of Medzev Issues a Denial"]

[Text] Yesterday's edition of THE NEW YORK TIMES carried an article on the life of Romanies in east Slovakia. Its reporter, Henry Kamm, visited several Romany settlements. The predominant sentiments expressed by their inhabitants are despair and uncertainty about whether they will ever find work, he writes.

Kamm also visited the town of Medzev. The local Roman Catholic priest, Miroslav Porvaznik, told him that the Romanies manage to survive on social security and spend most of it on alcohol and cigarettes, but that they would not have much more even if they worked.

In conclusion, the reporter quotes Medzev Mayor Jozef Pacai, who placed his glass of vodka on the table and allegedly declared: "The only solution is to shoot the lot of them." Then he apparently corrected himself and said not all of them, but it would be necessary to shoot some of them.

We read this part of the report—provided by the TA SR correspondent in Washington—to the mayor of Medzev yesterday during a telephone conversation. "That is not true!," exclaimed Mr. Pacai. "The American reporter set upon me with an interpreter and an escort on Saturday [13 November] two weeks ago during a lunch with my in-laws. At first, he wanted some information about Medzev, but later he asked only about the Romanies. I had the feeling that he wanted to provoke me into saying something ill-considered. So, after a while I refused to answer such questions. Prior to this, however, I had held a direct discussion with him about some of the problems that we have here with Romany unemployment, their with these problems in our town. Yes, we had a drink together, but, on my honor, I did not say anything about shooting; I would remember that. It must have irritated the American, since he was a very intrusive reporter, that I ended our conversation so abruptly."

Antall Letter To Government Read at Briefing

LD0212220693 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] This weekend a statement will be issued about Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's state of health. This was said at the government spokeswoman's briefing today.

[Correspondent] [passage omitted] [Interior Minister] Peter Boross handed over the prime minister's letter, addressed to the members of the government.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified woman's voice] Esteemed Ministers, my dear friends. My treatment in hospital does not make it possible for me to be present personally in this extremely significant part of the government's and parliament's work. I hoped that I would be able to take part in this work, this is how I timed my treatment in Cologne, and I tried to return home as soon as possible, maybe earlier than I should have done.

I am hereby sending my greetings, and at the same time, I express my thanks for your responsible activities. I ask you to continue to strengthen and express the government's unity with your loyal cooperation. I trust that in a short time we will be able to continue governing the country together.

[Signed] Jozsef Antall. [end recording]

Democratic Forum Spokesman Views Elections

AU0212211593 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 2 Dec 93 p 7

[Interview with Karoly Herenyi, spokesman for the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Gabriel Oszy-Toth; place and date not given: "Before the Elections—The MDF Is Preparing for Governmental Tasks Even After 1994"]

[Text] The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] does not have an appointed campaign chief, their participation in the elections is being organized by the management board as a team. In its series on the election plans of the parties, MAGYAR NEMZET is presenting the MDF this time. We interviewed Karoly Herenyi.

[Oszy-Toth] Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, chairman of the party, became ill after his return from treatment in Germany and he is still in the hospital. According to Sandor Lezsak, managing chairman of the MDF, the prime minister's recovery might take long weeks. Considering all this, is Antall still the MDF's only prime ministerial candidate? What happens if the prime minister's health will not allow him to participate in the election campaign? Is there anyone else on whom the MDF could base its campaign?

[Herenyi] I hope that it will be unnecessary to discuss this. I very much hope that the prime minister will recover. I would also like to use this opportunity to thank peole for the many thousands of letter and telephone calls we have received.

[Oszy-Toth] When will the MDF begin its campaign?

[Herenyi] According to the law, the real campaign period begins 30 days before the elections. We will concentrate our resources on this period. We are bound by the burden and responsibility of governmental work—this is our primary task—and we must fulfill our duties up to the last day.

[Oszy-Toth] Are you not worried that you may be behind the other parties?

[Herenyi] We are not worried. It is not certain that an early campaign is as effective as people who invented it think.

[Oszy-Toth] Does the short campaign also have financial reasons? Many parties, including the MDF, stated that they want an as cheap and clear as possible election campaign. After all, the cost of the campaign also matters for us, the citizens.

[Herenyi] Narrowing the campaign to the shortest possible period is one of the most obvious forms of saving.

[Oszy-Toth] What funds does the MDF have? Some months ago, the MDF acquired a large sum when it sold one of its office buildings. How much of this will be spent on campaign purposes?

[Herenyi] The issue of the sale is completely clear now. We used the money to extend our headquarters at Bem Square and to build offices in the provinces. We will mainly use the budget support—every party gets this—to cover the costs of the campaign, and donations from our supporters and sympathizers.

[Oszy-Toth] How big is this amount?

[Herenyi] I cannot yet tell you because I do not have exact information.

[Oszy-Toth] Can you estimate how much money the MDF will use for this purpose?

[Herenyi] I could estimate it, but there is not much point in it.

[Oszy-Toth] Most of the parties are talking about a clean campaign. At the same time, it is to be feared that the campaign will turn rough. How will it be possible to guard against the attacks? What will the MDF do for a clean campaign?

[Herenyi] A clean campaign can mainly be achieved through dignity and self-discipline. We do not need to respond to all challenges. The campaign will be positive! It should talk about what we want to do to restore the country's economy, eliminate unemployment, curb inflation, and to catch up with Europe. We must not by any means talk about the stupidity of our opponents and

how unsuitable they are—they themselves will talk about this. The code of ethics that will probably be signed by the parties in December might contribute to the purity of the elections.

Two weeks ago, a coordination meeting between the Hungarian Television and the six parties that were elected to parliament on list elections (only the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ, was missing), we managed to adopt a document on ethics that will also serve the purity of elections and unbiased reporting.

[Oszy-Toth] Who are targeted by the MDF's campaign? Whom would you like to win over?

[Herenyi] In my view, the nearly 1 million people who have acquired property as a result of compensation will reflect on the fact that, for 4 years, this had not even been mentioned. We hope that people who became part owners in their work places through the employees' share program will also vote for us. To sum it up, the increasingly marked and hopefully growing bourgeois strata—the bourgeois middle class—will be our voting base, whose establishment was one of our fundamental goals in 1989, and for whom stability, calmness, and predictable politics is important.

[Oszy-Toth] Of the founding fathers, it is almost only Sandor Lezsak who is still present in the MDF. Have you also lost the voters who voted for the MDF of the time in 1990?

[Herenyi] Very many of the founders are still members of the MDF, it is enough to mention Defense Minister Lajos Fur, a member of our national board. I do not believe that the broad basis that voted for us in 1990 would now turn away from us. We have to have a different message for them during the election campaign.

[Oszy-Toth] At the celebration organized for the fifth birthday of the Budapest MDF organization, Sandor Lezsak said that the MDF is expecting from 20 to 70 percent of the votes. Is he not too optimistic?

[Herenyi] There is some humor in this 20 to 70 percent. The gap is too wide to take it seriously. Even if we cannot repeat our 1990 result—when we achieved 42 percent—we will still be able to produce a similar result. The MDF is preparing for a governmental role after 1994. We started the program of national renewal and four years are too little to implement this. In spite of all opinions to the contrary, our results so far prove that we are on the right road. The next four years might be enough to make the processes that were started in 1990 completely irreversible.

[Oszy-Toth] What relations does the MDF have with the coalition parties? The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] has conducted a rather marked policy in recent months as it was trying to distance itself from the MDF, and the smallholders parties keep splitting into sections and then reuniting.

[Herenyi] We have an indisputable and invincible ideological affinity with our coalition partners. They are our real natural allies. Nevertheless, it is perfectly natural that, approaching the elections, the coalition parties are trying to present an independent image to the voters, and it is their own abilities, programs, and candidates, rather than the coalition, that they would like to have tested, In our view, after the elections—once we know the results—they will again be our primary possible coalition partners. The unfortunate disintegration of the smallholders party is also unfavorable for us, but it might again restore itself and fulfill its historical role.

[Oszy-Toth] In the past few months, the management board has been holding its sessions in provincial large towns where you have met the local MDF organizations, local people, entrepreneurs, and representatives of the church and the press. In 1990, the MDF had better results in the provinces. Is this what you are also expecting now?

[Herenyi] The MDF was indeed the party of the provinces and I believe that this will also be so in 1994. Some 75 to 80 percent of Hungarians are living in the provinces. It is easier for us to have a message for this voting basis. At our meetings in the provinces, we find out how the local people view the past three years and what kind of solutions they find feasible. We use this information when we draw up our program, because our goal is to make it as broadly acceptable to society as possible. Putting the country's economy in order is the primary and most important task. Ideological issues have been pushed into the background recently, and we are laying emphasis on boosting the economy, privatization, reducing unemployment, and establishing European living circumstances.

[Oszy-Toth] How much progress has the MDF made in selecting its candidates? Are there any conflicts in this area?

[Herenyi] It is our basic principle that we will have an individual candidate in all 176 electoral districts. We have confirmed more than 130 candidates so far. Naturally, there are some conflicts, but very few. This can happen when there are more than one candidates and we have to select the most suitable person. At the same time, we have some parliamentary deputies who will not accept nomination for the next four years.

[Oszy-Toth] Could you mention some names?

[Herenyi] I would not like to name them because the nominations have not been finished and someone might reconsider his position.

[Oszy-Toth] The MDF is maintaining contacts with a number of foreign parties—for example the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and the Christian Social Union [CSU] in Germany. Will well-known German politicians participate in the campaign?

[Herenyi] The electoral law excludes this possibility. I do not even know if there is any point in their being here. However, it is true that we receive very much methodological help from them.

[Oszy-Toth] What kind of coalition can the MDF foresee after the elections? With whom will it form an alliance and whom would it exclude?

[Herenyi] It is rather difficult to make predictions before we know the results. We would continue to work together with our current coalition partners. I believe that any form of coalition with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the SZDSZ is excluded.

[Oszy-Toth] Socialist parties won at recent elections in Poland and Italy. Some people fear a socialist restoration in Hungary while the MSZP is talking about a right-wing danger. What are the views of the MDF on this?

[Herenyi] The events in the above countries do not apply to Hungarian conditions. In 1990, the country showed that it did not want a socialist or left-wing government. The MSZP candidates reached good results in the first round but the opposition pushed back the left wing in the second round, and I think that this will be repeated in 1994. We are not afraid of a left-wing victory. The country has not forgotten so much in four years.

[Oszy-Toth] Are you not afraid that the electors have become indifferent toward politics and will not go to vote?

[Herenyi] Unfortunately, in the past four years, the sole purpose of some forces has been to convince people that there is no point in voting because nothing will change. However, the events of the past three and a half years prove that Hungary reached an outstanding performance in this region. The left wing has a voting basis that is very easy to mobilize and will vote under all circumstances. It will favor the left wing if few people go to vote. However, I believe that the Hungarian electors will be wise enough to realize this and large numbers of them will turn up to vote.

SZDSZ Opposition Outlines Policies

AU0312090993 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 2 Dec 93 p 3

[Correspondent's report: "SZDSZ Policy Toward Hungary's Neighbors Is Emerging"]

[Text] The issue of Hungary's neighbors and the Hungarian national minority living in these countries is one in which the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] has always been most critical of the current government's foreign policy. The next government must place its policy regarding this issue on new footings. There are still elements that need clarifying and polishing on this issue between the SZDSZ and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], and this can be done at the program coordination talks sometime after Christmas. Although there is no coordination on this issue between the largest opposition party and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], and the Socialists have not yet come up with their prepared program, SZDSZ experts see little essential difference in foreign policy, except for the debate on NATO membership. Among other things, this transpired at the meeting between Istvan Szent- Ivanyi, the SZDSZ-member deputy chairman of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, and journalists.

According to Szent-Ivanyi, the current government's policy on our relations with our neighbors is strong on rhetoric but has not brought the expected results. The cabinet practice is based on a strongly ideologically approach that regards the improvement of the situation of the Hungarian minority living in the neighboring countries as a precondition to developing bilateral relations. According to the SZDSZ, the problem does not only lie in the fact that the current government coalition is reducing bilateral relations to this one issue, but they are also using a wrong sequence of events in their search for a solution.

SZDSZ policy starts from the premise that we are basically interested in the development and consolidation of democratic institutions in neighboring countries. This way it becomes possible for the national minorities there not only to have their rights on paper but also to make use of these rights. The SZDSZ is aware that it takes time to improve relations, and a major breakthrough cannot be imagined in a short time; however, the SZDSZ sees opportunities for the tactics of small steps. Therefore, they welcomed [Foreign Minister] Geza Jeszenszky's visit to Romania, in which concrete agreements emerged that positively affect the citizens' situation.

Szent-Ivanyi also admitted that that the position of the Hungarian Government had changed recently, and he linked this to the signing and ratification of the basic treaty with Ukraine. Besides, according to the SZDSZ, it is only worth signing new basic treaties with our neighbors if such treaties contain the desire to eliminate the conflicts between the two countries and include procedures to implement this. According to the SZDSZ, this also includes the need to declare that Hungary does not have any territorial demands. (Szent-Ivanyi said that, today, the difference between the SZDSZ and the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] on this issue lies in the fact that the SZDSZ accepts such a declaration on a party level, while this is only a foreign policy matter within the MDF, which is strongly criticized from both "inside" and "outside.")

As for the national minority organizations beyond our borders, Szent-Iavanyi said that the SZDSZ wants to respect fully their sovereignty and independence. At the same time, the SZDSZ wants to consider their positions fully and is trying to create harmony between relations with the minorities and interstate relations. At the same time, Szent-Ivanyi pointed out that the system of regional contacts must not hinder our integration into Europe.

Trade Union Leader on Relations With Parties

AU0212192793 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 2 Dec 93 p 3

[Interview with Sandor Nagy, chairman of the National Federation of Trade Unions in Hungary, by Judit O-Varga; place and date not given: "For the MSZOSZ, There Is Also a Limit to the Left"]

[Text] "We do not wish to support anyone outside the framework of multiparty democracy and social market economy," Sandor Nagy told MAGYAR HIRLAP. On 1 December, the leadership of the National Federation of Trade Unions in Hungary [MSZOSZ] decided on the attitude it intends to have during the campaign preceding the 1994 parliamentary elections.

[O-Varga] In addition to its socialist and social democratic sympathies, the MSZOSZ also supports many political alternatives. However, in addition to your Christian democratic platform, a workers' group has also been set up that sympathizes with the Workers' Party [former Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party]. Until now, your federation has not had any links with the Workers' Party. For the MSZOSZ, is there a limit to the left?

[Nagy] Naturally, there is. We can only work together with those parties and organizations that think in terms of multiparty democracy and social market economy. We do not support anyone outside these limits.

[O-Varga] You have not actually had official links with the Workers' Party.

[Nagy] For the above mentioned reason. The fact that a group of our members sympathizes with the party does not also automatically mean the federation's sympathy.

[O-Varga] Do you take part in drawing up the programs of the parties that are supported by your platforms?

[Nagy] The experts of the various platforms will probably participate in formulating the sections in connection with employees.

[O-Varga] The MSZOSZ is preparing for general mobilization, rather than for party propaganda, in the campaign before the parliamentary elections. After the campaign preceding the election of local social insurance administration boards, this attitude resulted in a rather spectacular success for the trade unions, nar ly a 40 percent participation.

[Nagy] Naturally, we would like to use the positive experiences that we gained this spring. (People may remember that the campaign was free from quarrels.) We want to set an example of how political groups and parties that hold different views are also able to work together in the country's interest. Therefore, we encourage the Christian democratic, socialist, and social democratic platforms of our federation to work together in this spirit.

[O-Varga] Will the many hundreds of thousands of MSZOSZ members be obliged to vote for the parties supported by the platforms?

[Nagy] Obviously not. This is a personal issue and everything will be decided at the polling boxes. We do not have illusions: We only want to orientate our members to help them see who supports the interests of the employees and the pensioners.

[O-Varga] Will you also run for a parliamentary seat with the support of a party?

[Nagy] My name has been mentioned in a number of places. I have not yet made a decision, I have been given more time. I have to decide what is more important, leading the social insurance board or parliamentary work. Although this might seem unfashionable, it is also important for me what my family says to this question.

[O-Varga] On the basis of the law on chambers, the employers would have a much bigger say in legislation than the trade unions would. What are your views on this?

[Nagy] In our capacity of the employee side of the Interest Coordination Council, we wrote a letter to the parliament's chairman asking him to suspend the debate on this bill until the Interest Coordination Council can discuss this issue.

[O-Varga] On 3 December, the Interest Coordination Council will also have to decide on the minimum wages. What do you expect?

[Nagy] We definitely want to raise the 9,000 forints minimum wage. This is the reason we agreed to support the request of the employers: They want better conditions for the entrepreneurs in 1994.

Arms Manufacturers Want Army Development Plan

AU0212181493 Budapest MTI in English 1637 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Budapest, 2 December (MTI)—Heads of 13 Hungarian arms manufacturers called for a national industry lobby, a long-term Hungarian Army development plan, and a new budget structure.

The conference, organized by the Military Industry Sub-Committee of Hungarian Parliament's Defence Committee at Parliament, was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Defence.

The arms manufacturers called attention to how, with limited financial resources, self-financing can only be developed if the requirements of the Army for the next 10 to 15 years become clear. A plan to transform armaments will not be in itself enough, to say nothing of it costing 1,000 billion forints ($10 billion).

Foreign Minister's Visit to U.S. Previewed

LD0212201693 Warsaw PAP in English 1606 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 2—Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski will go to the United States on December 13-16 to discuss Poland's security and her participation in Western security structures, Director of the North and South America Department in the Foreign Ministry Zbigniew Lewicki told reporters on Thursday.

We are convinced that NATO, the United States and Germany have not yet decided on Poland's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty, Lewicki said.

He added that during the visit, to be paid before NATO January summit, Olechowski will meet with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other U.S. government officials to present Polish stance on membership of NATO and on United States "Partnership for Peace" proposal.

Lewicki said that a few days ago Poland had sent her informal stance to this effect to the United States. The idea of "Partnership for Peace" is perceived in Poland as a step forward towards integration with NATO. "We do not want to examine this question outside this context irrespectively of what the other side is saying," Lewicki said. "The membership of NATO remains our main target," he added.

He said that Poland's stance stressed the need for NATO to take different approach towards particular states. He recalled that in line with the proposed formula of the "Partnership for Peace" every state that signs an agreement with NATO should supplement it with its own scheme, whose implementation would testify to the states' ability to joint the organization.

Lewicki further explained that Poland is of the opinion that the implementation of "Partnership for Peace" should envisage Poland's future membership of NATO and that the clause saying that "partnership" is a necessary but not sufficient condition to gain the membership of NATO should be adopted without the latter part.

Olechowski Discusses NATO, WEU

BR0312102593 Brussels LE SOIR in French 3 Dec 93 p 1

[Interview with Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski by Pol Mathil in Brussels; date not given: "Polish Anxiety"]

[Text] [Mathil] This is your first visit to Brussels as foreign minister in the new post-communist Polish Government. As "President Walesa's man" why did you agree to join a leftist government and guarantee its "virginity," as it were?

[Olechowski] You have to have concrete arguments to reject a proposal of this kind coming from the president. Furthermore, I am finding that there is no need for me to renounce my liberal beliefs to remain in this government. Polish democracy is in good working order, and the economy is moving toward the market. Poland is not returning to communism. Our reforms could make progress much more quickly, but obviously the lack of any clear prospects of adhesion, of political readiness on the part of the West to meet us half-way, is weakening Polish enthusiasm vis-a-vis Europe.

[Mathil] If Europe said that it would grant you one wish, what would that wish be?

[Olechowski] To give us a calendar for integration, not the actual dates, but details of the stages and real phases of hope.

[Mathil] What about NATO? The Poles seem convinced that, for selfish, or sometimes cynical reasons, NATO is refusing to welcome them into the fold. Why do you need Western guarantees of security? To protect you against what danger?

[Olechowski] The "war of the White House" in Moscow sent a shock wave through Poland. The latest polls indicate that the number of Poles anxious about questions concerning the security and sovereignty of their country has nearly doubled.

[Mathil] Since the assault mounted against the Russian Parliament?

[Olechowski] Not just that, but also some statements that were "neo-imperialist" in tone. We are proud of what we have achieved in recent years, and are convinced that our house is in order, that there is no internal threat, and that no danger can come from outside. Do not forget that the events in Moscow already upset us twice when the Russian democrats were forced to face up to an alliance of "browns" and "reds."

[Mathil] The two coups, in August 1991 and October 1993?

[Olechowski] Yes. We have ringside seats, as it were. Admittedly, it should be stressed that we believe in the future of democracy in Russia. However, we also know that the price could be enormous, and that xenophobia, nationalism, and adventure are all part of it. We will suffer from a sense of insecurity for as long as some of the countries in our region remain unstable.

[Mathil] Because you are living in what the Russians call "the zone of closest neighbors," the zone of their influence? Where are the borders of this zone?

[Olechowski] Even we, who are after all so close, do not always know how to interpret the signals sent out today by Moscow. Our argument is simple. A democratic, peaceful Russia should not see any danger in a Poland that is a member of NATO, an alliance created to defend democratic values.

[Mathil] How do you explain the hardening of Moscow's tone with regard to any planned integration by Poland into Western structures?

[Olechowski] The electoral period explains a great deal. However, the visible build-up of nationalism is causing us serious worries. We know how it begins, but never where or how it will end. Poland is aware of the danger. It is a risky game.

[Mathil] In this respect, the CSCE meeting in Rome on Wednesday [1 December] would appear to have been particularly significant.

[Olechowski] The main item on the agenda was the blank check demanded by the Russians for the peace missions in the former Soviet republics. They were not given one.

[Mathil] But nevertheless they are going to do it.

[Olechowski] Who else would want to?

[Mathil] So?

[Olechowski] So the West must assume its responsibilities. The period between the European summit in December, the NATO summit in January, and the WEU [Western European Union] summit in May will be the time of greatest danger. If the West continues to rebuff us, and if—as we believe will be the case—it continues to succumb to Russian pressure, the number of our citizens who will abandon the Western option will increase, and could force us to adopt a different tack. Make a gesture, even if only a symbolic one.

[Mathil] For example?

[Olechowski] Give us a calendar, like the one for European Union. Give us WEU associate status, the chance to make our contribution to the joint European and Western project. I will be in Washington in mid-December, probably as the last Central European foreign minister before the NATO summit. We will then have the Russian elections behind us, and the international climate will be more relaxed. We will be able to discuss a European economic and security system in peace and quiet, obviously with the full participation of Russia, but where the East will be the East, and the West will be the West. Poland has been, is, and will always be part of the West. In every respect.

[Mathil] In Rome, on the subject of the Western attitude in the face of Russian pressure, the Estonian delegation raised the specter of Yalta, symbol of the division of the world. How did you react?

[Olechowski] I did not react at all. The appearance of this specter annoys—but does not surprise—me in the light of the West's ready acceptance of the Russian "nyet" regarding our relations with NATO.

[Mathil] Your prime minister chose Miss Wachowicz, who was "Miss Poland 1992" as his spokesperson. Another Polish woman was voted "Miss World." Are you thinking of hiring her?

[Olechowski] No, but I would like to have the best possible relations with the prime minister's spokeswoman.

UD's Mazowiecki on KLD Merger, Party

WS0212120093 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0715 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Interview with UD Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki by Andrzej Woyciechowski at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw; from the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Text] [Woyciechowski] Radio Zet's guest today is Tadeusz Mazowiecki, chairman of the Democratic Union [UD]. Good morning to you.

[Mazowiecki] Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen.

[Woyciechowski] What will happen to UD? Will it fall apart?

[Mazowiecki] No, I do not think it will. But we have to face the problem of transforming the party in connection with our merger with the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD].

[Woyciechowski] So the merger is a sure thing? The way you said it, it sounded like the merger was already determined.

[Mazowiecki] I think so, but the final decision on our part has to be made by UD's Extraordinary Congress—our internal legal provisions say that, and being a democratic party, as the name suggests, we give the Congress the right of final say.

[Woyciechowski] And when will the Congress take place?

[Mazowiecki, hesitating] Well, we are in the process of debating precisely that issue. A session of UD's Council will take place this coming Saturday [4 December] and Sunday, and a date for the Congress to have its session will be suggested then. I am ....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Is it going to be in a month, two months, or six months?

[Mazowiecki] We are required to notify all the delegates two months before the Congress.

[Woyciechowski] So in other words, it is a question of two to three months?

[Mazowiecki] Something like that.

[Woyciechowski] Are you personally in favor of a merger with KLD?

[Mazowiecki] Yes, I am in favor, even though it is my view that the UD Council's resolution on that was made in an atmosphere of all kinds of post-election issues holding people accountable for various things; there were also many frustrations and so forth, and I would say the decision was made all suddenly. But even despite all that, the direction the resolution is heading is a correct one, and I also am in favor of the merger.

[Woyciechowski] What would a merger mean politically speaking? There must be some differences in terms of party programs and political profiles, between UD and KLD. And now those differences will cease to exist which means .... What does it mean anyway?

[Mazowiecki] In my view, the most important problem politically speaking is whether we will succeed in making this something more than just an arithmetical joining of two numbers—I mean of our members with those of KLD. What we want is that, as a result of that transformation, a party is established that would not be a brand-new one, but a continuation of UD and KLD—of course I mean here primarily a continuation of UD's legacy. This continuation must be open to people who refused to join either UD and KLD but who will be willing to join a united party.

[Woyciechowski] So in other words, that means a new electorate. But while merging with KLD, UD will certainly have to give something up in terms of political profile and party program. What will it give up?

[Mazowiecki] I do not think it is necessary for us to give anything up....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Does it mean that KLD will give something up?

[Mazowiecki] You know, all these discussions are still ahead of us. I think that there may be people both in UD and in KLD who will not find their place after this process of merger or transformation has been completed. That cannot be absolutely excluded. But I do not think it is an issue of giving something up. I would say it is rather an issue of a more substantial kind of coming to an agreement. I also think the road to a merger should have a double nature: On the one hand, it should include very close cooperation between our two parties at the level of UD and KLD regional councils and centers, and also with participation of other people when it comes to self-governmental elections. We do not regard the upcoming self-governmental elections as a test of our strength because such elections are very specific due to being local elections—and that is true all around the world, including Poland. So one must understand that these elections cannot be regarded as a test, but they will be nevertheless an opportunity for substantial cooperation by our and KLD's activists.

[Woyciechowski] You mean practical, day-to-day, comprehensive cooperation.

What will be the new party's name? Will it be Liberal Union?

[Mazowiecki] I do not know that. It is an open issue. Naturally, there is the issue of both parties having a sentiment for their respective names. But there is also another factor—one has to work long and hard to gain a reputation associated with one's name, and also to engraft the name in people's awareness. And so any kind of compromise in that area does not come easy ....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] But someone will have to give up. Which party will it be?

[Mazowiecki] There are different ideas circulating currently. I would say the issue of a name is a very important one, but I think it will be deliberated upon at the very end [words indistinct]

[Woyciechowski] Today one can talk about this openly, at a point when both parties are about to merge and the elections are long gone. I mean who is really to blame for the failure to come up with a joint UD-KLD electoral list? Is UD to blame more, or is it KLD? Or is there someone who is personally responsible?

[Mazowiecki] It is not easy to answer your question. At UD's Congress in Szczecin I put it this way: The situation is such that the reasons [for the election defeat] arose at the rank-and-file level, but attempts are now made to ascribe responsibility to the leaderships. What I mean by saying that the reasons arose at the rank-and-file level—at least with regard to UD—is that UD's Council was very much in favor of the party going it alone in the elections, and there was a majority of votes favoring that position. One could have tried—we made such attempts—to get ready for a possible change in the decision and in choosing a coalition. But that option could have been attempted up to the point where the preparations gathered full speed, I would put it this way. At that point in time, it became very difficult to make a decision because there was a danger of us taking part in the elections together, but with a very fractured UD, and then one would have to rectify that in all our regions. But there is no doubt that all things considered, we all made a mistake then.

[Woyciechowski] But if my understanding is correct, it was UD that did not want a coalition with KLD, not vice versa? You said that ....

[Mazowiecki, interrupting] No, no.

[Woyciechowski] So KLD did not want that either?

[Mazowiecki] I think what was missing was the political will in both our parties' leaderships, which would enable the leaderships to explain all that to the rank-and-file members. A persistent political will was clearly missing. And I also do not want to shift the blame to the other side, but KLD's political interest in that was greater than ours. So had they shown a greater determination, our response would have been more positive as well. But I repeat—the blame should be divided equally between both our parties.

[Woyciechowski] A merger of political parties brings negative images to Polish people's minds. History teaches us that it was always the case of one party dominating over the other, and so mergers were always regarded as a bit ungenuine. Are you not afraid of that now?

[Mazowiecki] You know, I think that there are different kinds of antisentiments against the merger—including within UD—even though UD's Council made a definite decision on conducting talks aimed at the merger. There

is all kinds of resistance against it. I would say they differ between our regional levels and our leadership. There are also UD's internal problems which the decision caused. But I am free of the kinds of mental images that you suggested associated with mergers which had taken place in the period of the Polish People's Republic [PRL]. That is because the merger must be the result of a consensus in the leadership circles of both parties, and that consensus cannot be voted upon—either it will emerge, or not.

[Woyciechowski] Who will be the leader of this new united party? Will it be Bielecki, Tusk, Mazowiecki, or Frasyniuk perhaps?

[Mazowiecki] This is an open question. It remains to be seen. I would not say anything about this issue, especially because you mentioned me as one of the candidates. However, I believe that all the leading and valuable people should be taken good advantage of here. We should not omit or lose anyone here.

[Woyciechowski] Why did UD lose the last elections?

[Mazowiecki] I think that this is because we had to pay for the difficult decisions that had been made for the past four years, also by UD. I would say that this is the most important reason for the defeat; also, it is the objective reason. Certainly, the defeat was also caused by some direct mistakes that were made by the government, or by UD. Moreover, there was no coalition, really. However, I believe that the first reason was the most important one. As you know perfectly well, we had to ward off constant attacks from the left and from the right.

[Woyciechowski] You have said that it was the price you had to pay for being in the government. However, the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] was also part of the government for some time. This party did not pay such a price.

[Mazowiecki] This party never presented itself as a grouping that is to a certain extent responsible for being in my government. It never presented itself as a party sharing the responsibility. On the contrary; it offered very sharp criticism.

[Woyciechowski] You have already answered my first question; you said that UD is not threatened by a split. However, there is a certain split, a division in UD. There is some kind of a conflict, is there not? What does it lie in?

[Mazowiecki] I think that we should look at it in the following way. I would say it like this: I believe that internal affairs should first of all be discussed inside an organization, and certainly they should first be discussed by insiders, and not by the newspapers. It is not very good if they are first discussed in press interviews and only then they are tackled in inner circles. However, I would say that when a given party ceases to be a ruling party and ceases to be a member of a very difficult coalition, and becomes an oppositional party, it is only natural that there are some problems, accounts to be settled, criticism, and so on and so forth. UD supported the previous coalition; however, it did not always felt it could exert enough influence on that coalition, or on that government. It backed up the government and it was loyal; however, some problems cropped up there. This is the first layer of the problem. The other layer is a certain frustration after the elections; it does not necessarily concern the number of UD deputies; it rather concerns the entire parliamentary configuration, which is very disadvantageous to us....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] To cut a long story short, the shock after the total defeat in....

[Mazowiecki, interrupting] Well, it is an exaggeration to say that it was a total defeat. Thus, these problems are natural, in a way; the only thing is, we have to discuss them in inner circles, only then outside the party. Various statements made in public may cause trouble....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] These statements are often made by young impatient people. Do you think that Frasyniuk should go?

[Mazowiecki] No, God forbid. I do not think he should go; however, I think that he should be more dynamic....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Still more dynamic?

[Mazowiecki] Yes, still more dynamic; however, not in press interviews, but in positive activities for his party. As the deputy chairman, he should become more dynamic by taking on new duties, and so on. However, he certainly should not go.

[Woyciechowski] Tadeusz Mazowiecki, leader of the greatest oppositional party in today's Sejm, and former prime minister. How does he evaluate the present prime minister? How would you evaluate the present government?

[Mazowiecki] Well, it is still too early to make any evaluations. I would put it this way: The first area of conflict is the problem of self-governments, which we treat as a very serious problem, because it means the model of the state. We must decide whether we want to stimulate the local initiative and implement a program of decentralization, or not. Here, in this area, we are very critical of the attitude of this government and of this coalition, as well as of the measures that it has taken. Now, another problem may turn out to lie in economic issues. This coalition has made certain promises; now that it has become familiar with the condition of the budget, it is retreating from those promises. Now....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] However, can the opposition criticize the coalition for retreating from unreal promises?

[Mazowiecki] No, it cannot. However, there is one thing that the opposition can point to: The coalition should explain this to its voters, not because we have the right to demand that it explain this to the voters; however, there is the problem of public opinion. That is, the previous governments were criticized that they could give more to the people, but they simply would not do that. Now that

one comes to the conclusion that this is impossible, or possible only to a minimal extent, then this should be frankly admitted and explained. We believe that we have the right to demand this.

[Woyciechowski] What do you personally think of Kwasniewski's apology?

[Mazowiecki] Well....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] In other words, is this sufficient for you? Do you feel satisfied?

[Mazowiecki] No, no, I do not. You know, any apology for what happened during the martial law and other periods is worth something and means something. Such an apology was also made by Wojciech Jaruzelski; I think that first of all this apology was genuine. Now, I have positively evaluated Mr. Kwasniewski's apology, even though it was discussed and advertised too much. We must also remember that before this apology, there was a statement that we can now walk with our heads held high. It sounds as if we had discriminated against them for the past four years. Apart from that, the strength of this apology was diminished by comparing Comrade Szmaciak [symbol of rank-and-file communist activists in the times of PRL] with buddies [of "Solidarity"]. I would say that these two can hardly be compared. Nevertheless, I think that this apology should be appreciated. I would put it like this: I appreciate it, but I do not overrate it.

[Woyciechowski] Is this coalition going survive four years? Will the next elections be held in line with the schedule?

[Mazowiecki] Well, I do not like such forecasts, because they are usually inaccurate. Power certainly links people; however, I can also see the first conflicts within this coalition or within these parties. However, we must look at it as a permanent phenomenon and our place is in the opposition. We do not count on any calculations that something will change here very soon.

[Woyciechowski] Now, the last question....

[Mazowiecki, interrupting] Our general strategy depends on this. This strategy must consist in creating some alternative to this configuration, not calculating who with whom [word indistinct]

[Woyciechowski] Now, the last question. Out of these two parties, the Democratic Left Alliance and PSL, which one does UD dislike less?

[Mazowiecki] I think that we should keep the same distance.

[Woyciechowski] Thank you very much for the interview.

[Mazowiecki] Thank you.

Daily Views Presidential Vetoes of Sejm Laws

WS0112150093 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by Jerzy Pilczynski: "Presidential Vetoes—Principles or Precedents?"]

[Text]As time goes by, the Small Constitution reveals ever more of its drawbacks and negative sides. They were particularly visible during the period of change of the Sejm term, and the break linked with it. It can be concluded from a recent debate on establishing an Extraordinary Commission aimed at examining whether Hanna Suchocka's government acted in accordance with the legal system over the period from 31 May to 14 October (which is when the cabinet was outside of the scope of parliamentary control), that a five-month break like this is definitely too long, and should never occur in the future.

Earlier, we had to deal with the problem of whether an "old" government is empowered to submit legislative motions before a "new" Sejm. Another problem was, which of the proceedings initiated in the First Term Sejm should be continued in the current Sejm (and which should be discontinued). During debates on these topics, constitutional arguments were interspersed with customary and doctrinal ones, and also with some political reasons.

It seems that at stake here are issues which on the one hand are very concrete, but on the other—have an enormous significance for the practical functioning of democracy. So I think the postulate of greater clarity in the area is self-explanatory.

Recently, two Sejm commissions came across such....

Hard Nuts To Crack

....in their activity.

The Sejm Presidium submitted three presidential motions concerning the right to veto laws enacted by the previous Sejm (that Sejm did not have time to process the motions) to the Sejm Legislative Commission (which, let us recall, is supposed to make sure the Sejm legislative process is conducted according to certain prescribed rules).

The Sejm Constitutional Responsibility Commission also found itself facing a dilemma as to what to do with proceedings initiated by the previous Sejm, concerning preliminary motions to enforce constitutional responsibility regarding some persons. This is about both constitutional and criminal responsibility of the authors of the 1981 martial law, and also about constitutional and criminal responsibility of Generals Wojciech Jaruzelski and Czeslaw Kiszczak for having destroyed shorthand notes from meetings of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee from the period from 1982 to 1989. There is also the case of both constitutional and criminal responsibility of Leszek Balcerowicz, Jan Krysztof Bielecki, Janusz Lewandowski, Henryka Bochniarz, Waldemar Kuczynski, and Tadeusz

Syryjczyk in connection with their activities conducted during performance of governmental posts.

Concerning laws that were vetoed by the president, they include....

Cooperative Law and So-Called Retirement-Pension Laws

....which relate to revalorization of retirement pensions and other kinds of pensions, and also to the same types of benefits for miners. The president vetoed, among others, the Cooperative Law, depriving employees of cooperatives of the right to be members of those cooperatives, and also depriving them of the right to be elected to cooperative supervisory boards. The president also questioned the way cooperative councils are set up, which in his view is a bit too administrative, let us put it this way. Apart from that, one can conclude from reading the reasons behind the presidential motion, that the Belvedere's assessment of the new Cooperative Law—which is itself a result of numerous and oftentimes too far-reaching compromises—was that the law is simply a case of bad legislation.

As far as laws on retirement pensions are concerned, the dilemma the president faced was whether to act in accordance with a sense of social justice, or whether to prevent the destruction of the Budget Act which would most probably bring about an economic disaster. While being fully aware that this way he exposes himself to the danger of losing popularity in senior citizen circles, the president decided to defend both the budget and common sense.

Neither the Small Constitution, Nor the State Tribunal Law

....nor even the internal Sejm rules, provide what should be done about a proceeding to bring someone to constitutional responsibility, in the case where the proceeding does not reach its conclusion within a particular Sejm term. In this situation, an analogy presents itself to an already-established constitutional convention in cases of legislative proceedings that expire along with a Sejm term. That was also the suggestion made by experts, when it was deliberated at the beginning of the First Term Sejm whether to continue proceedings against Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski based on the charge of trying to dissolve the Gdansk shipyard. It seems that for political reasons, a decision was made to act in a different way than what the experts had advised. This way, a precedent was established.

Article 18 of the Small Constitution allows the president to veto an already-enacted law, followed by its resubmission before the Sejm along with a motion coupled with written reasons behind it. The Sejm is supposed to deliberate on the vetoed law again. And what it is empowered to do, is overrule the presidential veto by passing the law again, with a two-thirds majority vote.

When we talk about "passing again" or "deliberating again" with regard to laws, one could assume that there is an integral link here with an earlier legislative proceeding. So the proceeding should expire along with a Sejm term. Otherwise, we would be dealing with two categories of laws: Unvetoed laws expiring along with a Sejm term, and vetoed ones whose processing may continue in the new Sejm term.

Important doctrinal reasons favor the principle of a "legislative clean slate" for a new Sejm. The most important among those reasons is that the Sejm's personnel and political composition changes after elections. And that means that different views can now prevail in a new Sejm, as compared to the old one.

True, there are counterarguments that could be raised here as well, for instance that this way, the presidential veto (which the Small Constitution sets as subject to the possibility of being overruled by the Sejm) acquires a final nature since the Sejm can no longer take any position on the veto. But it is worth keeping in mind that that would not conflict with presidential powers. On the contrary—it would strengthen them. It also does not seem that it could weaken the Sejm, and that is precisely because it is already a different Sejm.

Unfortunately, some precedents were set by the previous Sejm also with regard to the issue of a presidential veto. The First Term Sejm deliberated the president's veto with regard to the Banking Law, and the Law on Radio and Television. That is why the Sejm Presidium's suggestion is to act the same way this time as well. The Sejm Legislative Commission opposes that, and its position is based on some arguments that need no explanation in the world of doctrines and theory. A decision will have to be made by the Sejm Presidium, and it will have to occur before the Sejm's next session when these issues are scheduled to be debated. It seems that the better solution would be for parliamentary law to unambiguously resolve these issues.

Senate Approves 6-Percent Import Tax

LD0212124393 Warsaw PAP in English 1213 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 2—The Senate (upper house of parliament) approved a law on import tax on goods purchased abroad, passed by the Sejm (lower house) last week, on Thursday and concluded its 75 minute sitting. Now, the law goes to the president for signature.

Under the law, if signed by the president, a 6 per cent tax on all imported goods would replace the additional 6 per cent customs duty paid now. It would be in force for only one year starting January 1, 1994.

Senators stressed that the import tax should give the state budget an extra revenue of some 15 trillion zlotys (750 million USD).

Spiroiu Discusses NATO Adherence Issues

AU0212181193 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 29 Nov 93 pp 1, 3

[Report on a speech by Defense Minister Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu at a seminar on the mass media held in Bucharest from 26-28 November: "After the Collapse of the Warsaw Pact"]

[Excerpts] Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu, minister of national defense, who participated in the seminar on "Mass Media—the Stimulator/Inhibitor of Social Tendencies," read an interesting paper on relations between the press and the country's defense bodies. [passage omitted]

I personally encourage everything connected with democratic principles in the military bodies as much as possible. From this point of view, military bodies are clearly at a disadvantage compared with the civilian press on which no one can impose restrictions, unless the political power, interested in ensuring the maximum efficiency of its military arm, decides on legal ways and means to ensure a sort of protection. [passage omitted]

In genuine democracies with a long-standing history of ensuring human rights, the military subject is always treated by a specialized journalist, a specialized professional who is familiar with the laws, customs, and traditions of the military bodies and who is able to consciously and objectively process the information he has about the army and its people. [passage omitted]

As an institution of the democratic state, we have the obligation under the Constitution to sufficiently and coherently explain the nature of this institution and to justify our way of action, so that the civilian society does not feel frustrated, eschewed, or the possessor of a hermetic, alienated, absolutely independent, and thus inestimable body. It is the civilian society's right to control this institution. In countries going through the period of transition to a law-governed state, a lack of communication translates into fear of military bodies leaning toward a certain political party and thus losing their neutrality and obligatory equidistance. [passage omitted]

In Romania, the army's firm equidistance and political neutrality has guaranteed its role of a stabilizing factor at home and as a potential element of regional stability. This attitude, coupled with efforts to restructure military institutions, has gradually eliminated certain tendencies to suspect possible authoritarian intentions, which actually lack any grounds. Such insufficiently thought out ideas and insinuations have come from people with political or press responsibilities and can be explained solely through a lack of information, of which we are equally guilty. The press, however, has the right and capability to influence the political will and to control military institutions. I would like to quote a brief example: On the basis of statistics, the specialized bodies of the Romanian Army have noted that before special events in the past years, in general, such as, let's say, elections—and last year we had three or four such events, 22 December when we celebrate the December 1989 revolution, and even the visits announced by the former sovereign—thus, at such times the amount of critical articles about the army is twofold or even threefold as a reflex of fears that the army might get involved in the tension generated by political confrontations. [passage omitted] It is obviously wrong to believe that the army got scared by such campaigns. [passage omitted]

Through the transparency of the military bodies, we avoid involuntary errors in projecting the army's image in society by strictly delimiting, however, the boundaries of military secrets. [passage omitted]

The Romanian Army's restructuring and modernization program includes measures to ensure the necessary transparency, so that information may flow freely, competently, and legally, while the signals of the civilian press should be interpreted correctly and without any discrimination.

In connection with Romania's adherence to NATO, Defense Minister Niculae Spiroiu said: "Regarding the fact that certain countries have applied for admission to NATO, I have the impression that we are not talking of an application, but solely of certain statements. It is NATO that decides when it will admit new members or associate members and on what basis and so forth. And, as far as I know, the Alliance has not yet opened, so to say, a register for applications. This is why we are just talking of statements. Indeed, two and half years ago, the aforementioned countries said clearly that they wanted to join NATO. As State Secretary Marcel Dinu said here, and correctly so, we were not among the countries in a hurry to join NATO. We believed that after an alliance [Warsaw Pact] was dismantled, it is befitting to have a security system permitting us—through bilateral contacts within the CSCE Process—to achieve a new security structure in Europe, "step by step." Very correctly, it has been said that these clear-cut statements by the three states, which later became four [Visegrad group], brought about a sort of competition.

As far as I am concerned, even two days before the Travemuende meeting, I had a discussion with my German colleague, Mr. Volker Ruehe, during a visit to Bonn, to whom I explained our official position in accordance with the mandate entrusted to me by the government and presidency, namely that what we want in this area is an equal security system for all that would not be opposed in any way or viewed by Russia as a system opposed to Russia. That is out of the question. We have said that a security system without ensuring equal security for all and without an independent Ukraine is out of the question. Likewise, I are of the opinion that Russia should not be marginalized. Thus, I have explained the important role the Russian Federation may play in creating this system of security; and, of course, what remains to be done by the alliance, by the

Russian Federation itself, is to establish ways and means to achieve this. One thing is sure, namely that the very clear requests for admission by the aforementioned states have brought about a certain competition. But this competition is not what counts, but the achievement, the seeking of solutions to establish an equal and nondiscriminating security system, without any other borders, without pressure that may increase the feeling of insecurity of states in this so-called tense zone due to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and what is happening in the area of the former Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Things are very clear: This alliance—if we are not talking of an aggressive alliance—wants guarantees that its security is not threatened by someone else. If all states join the alliance, it means that no one is threatening the alliance and it has to seek new dimensions of action. In my view, NATO did very well to look for a third dimension, it has assumed the task of promoting the CSCE process by various means: Partnership. This partnership for peace, which differs from the partnership within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, will probably continue to be accepted. Thus, this will already be a bilateral state-alliance relationship, while now it is a collective contract, if you will, of partnership—between the state and the alliance; it goes without saying that there will be certain standards for the given state concluding this partnership contract for peace, namely the nonfulfillment of these standards will lead to the self-elimination of the given state. This seems to me very democratic. Thank you.

Ex-King Mihai Sends Message on National Day

AU0212191293 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 30 Nov 93 p 3

["Message by His Majesty King Mihai I of Romania on the 75th Anniversary of the Great Union 1 December 1918-1 December 1993: 'Romania Cannot Belong To Some People Alone, It Belongs to All Romanians'"]

[Text] Romanians: On 9 November 1993, I addressed each of you. At that time, I announced my decision to visit Romania in order to be at the side of the Romanians on the soil of our fatherland to celebrate together the 75th anniversary of our Great Union.

The year 1918 marked the moment when all Romanians, prompted by the same enthusiasm for national unity, created modern, prosperous, and independent Romania, which gained its place among the great and rich nations of Europe. Despite all suffering, political leaders, the people, our Church, and our glorious army under my grandfather's leadership, King Ferdinand, were harboring the same hope. Nevertheless, today, unbearable misery is overwhelming most of you.

Four years after the revolution, the tremendous hopes each one of you was harboring for the future of your family and the country did not come true. What all of you note around you is starvation, shortages, the cold, and corruption; all this, despite your goodwill, work, and patience.

Like all of you, I know—and I have often said so—that union and reconciliation among all Romanians constitutes an indispensable condition for saving our country from its current misery. Our fatherland needs all its sons. This is the only way to avoid desperation and ruin.

December 1 could have offered each person in Alba Iulia an opportunity to achieve this union and national reconciliation. This anniversary should have been an opportunity to renew our historic tradition. In his patriotic pride, each Romanian should have been able to stretch out his hand to the other Romanians, in a brotherly way and without hidden thoughts. This was the purpose for which each one should have made a special effort for the benefit of all.

Unfortunately, similar to the years of absolute communism, everything possible was done to stop me from visiting the country. All of you know from the papers, radio, and television programs how my presence amidst you was prohibited. You are my witnesses and tomorrow you may judge for yourselves.

Each one of you will draw his own conclusion on this rejection, which goes beyond my person and is directly addressed to the people, especially to the hundreds of thousands of Romanian men and women who withstood all obstacles to welcome me during the Easter Holiday of 1992.

Thinking of the future of our country, I regret that those who are leading it today have not yet relinquished the habits of the communist dictatorship during which they held high-ranking public positions. Today, when we desire unity, they have split us. Also today, when we want reconciliation, they are afraid of us.

Under these circumstances, once again I want to express my firm will to do all I can to contribute to the stability, security, and dignity of all Romanians, without rejecting or condemning anyone.

I do not forget that, like in the case of King Ferdinand, my grandfather, history called on me during a tragic time for our fatherland to be the commander of our valiant army. That was the greatest honor ever in my life. Together with the people, the church, and the army, we were able to fight and win for Romania's sake.

Today, our Romanians want to come out of this misery and desperation. We have to struggle together for Romania by trying to unite in our thoughts, spirit, and actions.

Romania cannot belong to some people alone, it belongs to all Romanians. Romania will not be saved solely by some people, Romania will be saved by all. Romania cannot be prosperous for some people alone, it will be prosperous for all.

Romanians, beyond disputes, fear, and desperation, I pray that the Great Union, for which I am struggling for so many years now, be accomplished. We have to pray for all our fellow citizens who have died so that our fatherland may live freely, gloriously, and prosperously among the other nations.

We bow with respect and gratitude to the 1918 heroes and to all those of December 1989. They should set an example for us today and be our inspiration of tomorrow.

On Wednesday, 1 December, I, together with my family, will include each of you in my prayers and thoughts along with all those who are obliged by history to live away from us.

Romanians, Romania belongs to you. Have confidence in it. Have confidence in yourselves.

So may the Lord help you!

Mihai.

PD-FSN Calls For National Reconciliation

AU0212163193 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] A national day with protocol lists is a farce, said the vice president of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD-FSN], Mr. Adrian Severin, at the weekly news conference of this political formation. The latter and Mr. Victor Bostinaru briefed the journalists at length on the incidents in Alba Iulia and at the Baneasa Railroad Station in Bucharest.

Referring to the latter incident, Mr. Victor Bostinaru explained that, during the night of 30 November, an aggressive group made its appearance on the special train for parliamentarians, who were to depart for Alba Iulia. These individuals were wearing the emblem of the Greater Romania Party [PRM]. This group of individuals insulted and threatened the PD(FSN) parliamentarians.

Investigations made by the police and railroad representatives did not yield any results at the beginning. Eventually, when the parliamentarians refused to depart for Alba Iulia, the group that was not entitled to be on that special train, was obliged to get off, Mr. Bostinaru also specified.

Referring to these incidents, Mr. Adrian Severin announced that the PD(FSN) will demand that the minister of interior provide explanations and that he resign, arguing that the mentality of this minister and of the Vacaroiu government is like that in a police state.

In this context, Messrs. Adrian Severin and Victor Bostinaru also noted the aspect of, quote: a besieged city of Alba Iulia assessing this as a consequence of the sickly feeling of fear by those in power, unquote.

Messrs. Victor Babiuc and George Stancov, who participated in the meeting organized by the Democratic Convention of Romania in Bucharest, assessed it as an event at which all views, even diverging ones, were respected and at which there had not been any need for spectacular actions by the forces of order.

Answering journalists questions at the end of the news conference, Mr. Adrian Severin referred to the need for national reconciliation, which, in his opinion, consists of mutual communication between groups with different views on major problems. He emphasized that one cannot reach agreement on the basis of orders and dispositions.

PDSR Urges 'Constructive Cooperation'

AU0212163393 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] At the news conference given by the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], reference was made to the celebrations devoted to Romania's National Day and the 75th anniversary of the Great Union of 1918. It was assessed that, quote: Despite the boycott and diversions characterized by monarchist nostalgia, the celebration of the Union in Alba Iulia this year was a success of the political forces that have assumed the risks of governing the country during a critical period of our transition to the market economy, unquote.

The communique that was presented to the press also specifies that the PDSR continues to promote constructive cooperation among the political forces in the country, with a view to overcoming the difficulties faced by our country.

According to our reporter, in this connection and proceeding from consultations that the PDSR held this morning with leaders of the Alfa Cartel, the possibility of a meeting among all political parties represented in parliament and with trade unions leaders was emphasized in order to conclude a social pact that will lead to overcoming the current economic and social difficulties.

Serbs Target Civilian Areas in Old Sarajevo

AU0312100693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 3 Dec 93

[Text] Enemy artillery has been pounding Sarajevo since early this morning, especially the old part of the city. At about 0800, a mortar bomb landed near Careva Mosque killing (?two) and seriously wounding eight of our fellow citizens. Three bombs landed on Bistrik. At about 0820, a mortar landed in the vicinity of Skenderija.

Because of all this, a general alarm is in force in Sarajevo. We warn our citizens once again, particularly those in the old part of the city, to restrict their movements as much as possible because the [Serbian] aggressor has suddenly started directing artillery fire on civilian targets.

UNPROFOR Confirms Serbs Fired on Hospital

AU0212131493 Paris AFP in English 1243 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Dec 2 (AFP)—Fierce fighting raged all day Wednesday in the Olovo region north of Sarajevo and at Mostar, in southern Bosnia-Hercegovina, UN Protection Force spokesman Idesbald van Biesebroeck said Thursday [2 December]. He also reported that a mortar which hit Kosevo hospital here late Tuesday, killing three people and wounding three others, came from the Bosnian Serb side.

At the time the mainly Moslem Bosnian army said the shell had been fired from the Mrkovici zone in south Sarajevo where Bosnian Serbs are based. Van Biesebroeck said UNPROFOR military observers had since confirmed that conclusion.

He said that the Serbian side stepped up its shelling on Wednesday, with more than 120 rounds falling on the heights around the capital. One shell hit the UNPROFOR-held airport, stopping flights for several hours. It was not immediately clear where the shot came from.

Van Biesebroeck also reported that 250 shells fell Wednesday in the Olovo region, 30 kilometres (18 miles) north of Sarajevo. According to the press here, the Bosnian Serbs have been waging an offensive against Moslem troops in that region for several days.

Fighting continued in Mostar, where some 50,000 people are holed up in the Moslem part of the town under siege from Croat HVO forces. Van Biesebroeck said exchange of mortar and light weapons fire had gone on all day Wednesday.

More than 20 mortar shells fired from Serbian positions fell near an observation post manned by the Nordic battalion of UNPROFOR in Sapna, northeast of Sarajevo, causing major damage but no casualties, he added.

The Moslem enclave of Goradze had also come under bombardment and small weapons fire was reported from Gornji Vakuf, in central Bosnia, and the Vitez region, where there was also shelling.

Serb Military Sources Report on Fighting

LD0212142593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1321 GMT 2 Dec 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Bratunac, Zvornik, Dec 2 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslem forces in the past 24 hours continued their attacks on Serb settlements and positions in the eastern, northern and central parts of the ex-Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), while troops of the Bosnian Croats and of the Army of the ex-Yugoslav Republic of Croatia continued attacking the Serbs in the southwestern part of the BiH—said the Bosnian Serb military sources on Thursday [2 December].

The sources said that in the eastern BiH, Moslem units from the region of Gorazde (Moslem enclave and U.N.-declared safe zone) resumed their small arms and mortar fire on Cajnice and Foca.

In the northern BiH, Moslem units directed fire along most of the frontline in the Doboj region. They opened infantry fire on the Serb village of Lipovac on the Brcko battlefront.

In central Bosnia, Moslem forces resumed provocations in the Sarajevo, Srbobran (formerly Donji Vakuf) and Vlasic regions.

In the Sarajevo area, Moslem forces fired mortars on Donji Kotorac, Ilinjaca and on the Ozrenska street. They also sniped at all Serb sections of the city and on the outskirts, especially Vrace, Grbavica, Ilidza, Nedjarici and Lukavica.

In northern BiH, Bosnian Croat forces used infantry arms in attacking Serb positions in the Orasje region. Their attacks were less intensive than in the past few days, said Bosnian Serb military sources.

On the Capljina-Stolac battlefront in the southwestern part of the BiH, forces of Bosnian Croats and the Croatian Army launched more infantry attacks and opened anti-aircraft gun fire on Serb positions around Risnik and Bancici.

The Bosnian Serb military sources said that already fierce Moslem-Croat showdowns in central Bosnia and Mostar area were further intensified.

The sources said that inter-Moslem fighting continued unabated in central Bosnia and in the Mostar region.

They added that more inter-Moslem fighting was continuing between the followers of Alija Izetbegovic and those of Fikret Abdic in the autonomous province of West Bosnia (APWB), especially in the broader region of Cazin.

Moslem Radio Sarajevo announced on Thursday that the forces loyal to Izetbegovic, in their clashes so far with Abdic's followers, have had 36 dead, and 55 seriously and 105 lightly wounded.

Croat Offensive on Maglaj, Zavidovici Reported

LD0212225093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Olovo and Vares are still the areas where the aggressor is still attempting to advance. As many as nine aggressor tanks have been destroyed since the beginning of the latest offensive. The most furious clashes took place around the aggressor's position 1113 on the [word indistinct] plain. As far as civilian casualties are concerned, Zavidovici and Maglaj are suffering the most. The aggressor has been pounding them with large-caliber howitzers and mortars, killing two people and wounding two in Maglaj. In Zavidovici one person has been killed and five wounded.

The Croatian Defense Council [HVO] is still pounding Stari Vitez and using snipers, thus preventing humanitarian convoys from reaching this area. Helicopters continue to supply their [HVO] fighters with ammunition. The aggressor is also pounding Gornji Vakuf with mortars. HVO fighters have also attempted to launch fresh infantry attacks in the direction of Fojnica. Rifts and chaos are pretty much in evidence among their ranks across the entire theater of war.

Muslims Reportedly Fire Chlorine Missiles

LD0312000493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] The Muslim Army fired chlorine-charged missiles and other toxic shells on Grbavica and Ponjave in the Vitez municipality this afternoon, HBNA [Herceg-Bosna News Agency] reports.

A number of people requested medical help after being affected by dizziness, suffocation, and vomiting, the same source says.

UN's Cot Wants To Stay 'At Least Until Spring'

AU0212164493 Paris AFP in English 1629 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Zagreb, Dec 2 (AFP)—The U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has a "sacred, absolute moral obligation" to pursue its mission in ex-Yugoslavia at least until spring to prevent mass starvation this winter, the force's commander said Thursday [2 December]. "We must continue, no matter what happens, until the first days of spring," General Jean Cot of France told a news conference here.

"If by then," the situation has become "terrible...we would have to conclude that the leaders of all the parties have no consideration for their populations and draw the conclusions, after having, I hope, saved several hundred thousand people during the winter."

Cot said that when he asked local leaders if they believed their people could hold out much longer in the present dreadful conditions, the answer usually was that "they had seen as much before."

He stressed the problems UNPROFOR was having in trying to implement an agreement Bosnia-Herzegovina's warring factions concluded Monday [30 November] in Geneva to let through aid convoys and authorising the use of force against maverick fighters who blocked the passage of aid convoys.

On Wednesday alone there were 11 incidents targeted against UNPROFOR members, carried out "mostly by uncontrolled elements." These included attacks, the theft of a briefcase, and stealing a car. "It was a record for some time" and "does not seem to show the agreement is working," he said.

Former Yugoslavia was in fact "falling into anarchy" and, "especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (was) in a situation" which "resembles what the (1618-48) Thirty Years War did in Europe, with an upsurge in gangs, bandits, people who attack food trucks because they are dying of hunger," Cot said.

"This is going to get worse...and we must be ready to oppose it," he added.

The UNPROFOR commander reacted cautiously to allegations by the Bosnian Serb forces commander General Ratko Mladic that Bosnian government forces were using chemical arms. He said the two sides had traded similar accusations 10 times and that he had no confirmation, but believed "it's a false accusation."

Ljubijankic: Army Controls 'Four-Fifths' of Cazin

AU0212092393 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 26 Nov-3 Dec 93 p 6

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic by OSLOBODJENJE correspondent R.I., in Ljubljana; date not given: "Abdic Is a Quisling"]

[Text] Irfan Ljubijankic, foreign minister in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, traveling through Ljubljana, met with Bosnia-Herzegovina journalists temporarily employed and living in the Slovenian capital. Minister Ljubijankic spoke about his first experiences after assuming office, about talks within the framework of a small "diplomatic tour" to some central European countries, about a ministerial meeting in Debrecen, and about some questions related to the personnel situation in the ministry and in Bosnia-Herzegovina embassies abroad. Among other questions, the minister replied to two questions from OSLOBODJENJE.

[Correspondent] You met with Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, President of the Republic of Slovenia Milan Kucan, Slovenian Foreign Minister Alojz Peterle.... You probably discussed the case of "west Bosnia"?

[Ljubijankic] Yes. They all wanted to know about "west Bosnia" and I informed them about the present situation there, which cannot be fully grasped from the information at their disposal as provided by the media! I tried to explain the genesis of declaring the secession of the so called

"autonomous province of western Bosnia." The most pragmatic reason that influenced Fikret Abdic to undertake something of this kind was actually the shares in "Agrokomerc," which he was selling to our workers, thereby taking their money without any legal authorization to sell these shares. If he were to be tried for such a crime under the present laws, then he would be a major criminal, for we are talking about hundreds of millions of German marks. Naturally, organizing his own state would legalize his actions and prevent him from being punished for the crime that he committed. There are some social and psychological causes for Fikret's personality and the circumstances around him, which I attempted to explain to those gentlemen during our talks. They all agreed that he is definitely a quisling, a collaborator with Belgrade, and to a certain extent also a collaborator with Zagreb, which is trying to weaken the position of unitary Bosnia in order to impose the concept of the Bosnia-Herzegovina union. The situation in the Cazin Krajina is now, however, very good for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. It controls the most important positions over four-fifths of the territory. The army has taken the village of Todorovo. They seized two "B1" mountain cannons, which our army did not have. That means that they [Abdic's forces] had got them from the aggressor, from the Serbs. We previously seized two "Zises," very accurate artillery weapons, which Fikret had also obtained from our enemy. We might have dealt with Fikret earlier and in a more efficient manner, but no one wanted bloodshed between brothers. And Abdic is greatly responsible for that bloodshed. He is like a vulture. At the time when Bosnia needed help the most, he attacked it from the back, in an underhanded way, and went against his own people, against the state concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was working for our enemy.

[Correspondent] A new summit has been announced, to be held in Geneva. What do you personally expect from this meeting? What are the guidelines for the action of our delegation?

[Ljubijankic] We do not have all the details of the events that lead up to the new meeting in Geneva. Some initiatives have been made, and some documents are being prepared. We know about the Franco-German initiative, and some documents are being prepared by van den Broek, too. Our [UN] ambassador [Mohamed] Sacirbej has gone to Luxembourg and will stay there to monitor all the events that precede the meeting in Geneva. Of course, we will be going to Geneva and we will be acting according to the principles that for us constitute the ideal of Bosnia-Herzegovina—a civic Bosnia- Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders. Therefore, we will be between that ideal vision of Bosnia- Herzegovina and the real situation, to which we are being forced by the ferocious pressure of the international community. They want peace at all costs, regardless of whether it is just or not, and we must fight to get the best possible status, the best possible chances for our strategic concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for some tactical room for maneuver that would take us to that goal. It is interesting that at the same time as Geneva, the CSCE [Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe] will be meeting in Rome, and we will be carefully following all the news leading up to those important events. I will personally be endeavoring to see to it that the decisions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliament are respected in Geneva.

Humanitarian Aid Convoy Arrives in Gorazde

AU0212133293 Paris AFP in English 1317 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Dec 2 (AFP)—A convoy of humanitarian aid arrived Thursday [2 December] in the Moslem enclave of Gorazde, in central Bosnia, the first for nearly a month, a spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said. The convoy of 10 trucks brought mainly food but also equipment to help the population keep out the cold, like plastic sheeting for windows, spokesman Ray Wilkinson said.

He said the convoy's arrival after a blockage of aid to the Moslem enclaves in eastern Bosnia was evidence that the region's Serb forces were prepared to be "more flexible."

A second convoy of 11 trucks, carrying 18 tons of food and over-wintering equipment was expected in Gorazde later Thursday. Another convoy with 18 tons of food was to try to reach Tesanj, a Moslem-majority town in northern Bosnia, on Thursday, Wilkinson added. If the convoy reached its destination, it would be the first to enter the town since the end of October, he said.

Starvation in Doboj; Situation 'Critical'

AU0312120093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 3 Dec 93

[Text] The humanitarian situation on the free territory of Doboj is critical. In addition to the aggressor's continuous attacks with all types of weapons, some 30,000 residents of this region are threatened by hunger and cold. Not a single food convoy has reached this region yet, and the first cases of death from starvation and cold have (?already) occurred.

WHO Urges Free Movement of Heating Fuel

AU0112140893 Paris AFP in English 1350 GMT 1 Dec 93

[Text] Zagreb, Dec 1 (AFP)—Heating and engine fuel must be considered "the essential part of humanitarian aid" this winter in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the World Health Organization (WHO) said Wednesday [1 December]. The statement was made in an appeal to the warring sides that was endorsed by all nongovernmental aid organizations present in the conflict.

WHO official Hannu Vuora said many Bosnians were able to survive last winter's hardships because of coal stocks that have since been depleted.

"National governments of the former Yugoslavia and the international community have the power to present suffering and unnecessary deaths this winter," said Stephanie Simmonds, another WHO representative here. "Without political will, there will be zero quality of life for people in Bosnia this winter," she said.

Soldiers have often refused to let through—or have confiscated—humanitarian convoys carrying engine or heating fuels, saying fuel is a strategic product in the war.

Two weeks ago in Geneva, the three sides signed an agreement pledging to allow humanitarian aid convoys to cross their zones and to let the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees decide what constitutes such aid. But since then, the UNHCR has met with resistance in its attempt to transport fuels, construction materials for shelters, sleeping bags and other nonfood items.

Health Service Cites Casualty, Disease Statistics

AU0312125593 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 3 Dec 93

[Text] How the aggressor is observing the signed agreements in practice is best illustrated by the bulletin of the Republican Institute for Health Protection for the past week.

The aggressors killed 60 and wounded 167 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the past week. Despite the fact that they signed agreements, the aggressors from both the east and the west are not allowing the food convoys to pass through. The most endangered regions are still Tesanj, Maglaj, Gorazde, Mostar, Olovo, and Gornji Vakuf. In addition to food, they need clothing, footwear, and facilities for accommodating refugees and the displaced persons.

The epidemiologic situation on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains (?unfavorable). In the first 10 months of this year, 26,261 persons were registered to have infectious diseases.

Minister Rules Out Ceding Coast to Muslims

AU0212124393 Paris AFP in English 1214 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Zagreb, Dec 2 (AFP)—Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic has ruled out ceding any coastline to Bosnian Moslems, who are seeking access to the Adriatic, the Croatian news agency Hina reported Thursday [2 December].

Croatia "is ready to discuss economic questions, but will not make any territorial concessions," Granic said on returning here from the peace talks in Geneva.

Croatia envisages giving the Moslems port facilities in the major port of Ploce on the Adriatic, but is not prepared to give up Neum, the only stretch of coastline within Bosnia-Hercegovina, which is currently controlled by Bosnian Croat forces along 20 kilometres (12 miles).

Western experts said that if the Moslems were ceded that part of the coast, which in any event is not big enough to build a commercial port, it would cut Croatia in two.

Granic expected Croatia to continue to come under pressure because of Moslem demands for access to the sea. "It is clear that the Bosnian Moslems want an independent state and therefore the main topic at the Geneva negotiations will be to draw up the borders of that state."

He said that several ministers of member countries of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, at the Rome meeting which he attended, felt that Croatia's refusal to give up any part of the Adriatic coast was justified.

Government 'Very Satisfied' With CSCE Talks

LD0212134693 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, has returned from the CSCE conference in Rome. Branko Merlin reporting from a news conference at Zagreb airport.

The CSCE ministerial meeting focused mainly on the CSCE's internal setup, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and preventive and supervisory mechanisms for preventing conflicts. Minister Granic described the meeting in the following words:

[Begin Granic recording] The meeting of the CSCE ministers in Rome has not resulted in any major changes in the world's policy, but it described the current situation very well. The Republic of Croatia can be very satisfied with the final report and the adopted working document with respect to the formulations about the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian areas under UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] protection into Croatia's state and legal system. The documents also included the formulation that mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia is one of the bases for establishing peace, the formulation whereby the Republic of Croatia (?calls for) a long-term CSCE mission in the Croatian areas under UNPROFOR protection in order to ease the peaceful reintegration, and for several other formulations important for us—such as the possibility of creating a regional security mechanism. [end recording]

Minister Granic says that, following the meetings in Rome and Geneva, it is perfectly clear that the Bosnian Muslims want an independent state and that the talks in the future will deal with defining the territory of that state:

[Begin Granic recording] There will be additional pressure on Croatia in connection with Muslim demands to have access to the sea. Our stances are well known. We are prepared to discuss the economic status and proposals with which you are familiar already. However, there will be no territorial concessions. [end recording]

Many foreign ministers endorse Croatia's justifiably firm stands not to grant any territorial concessions, Granic said, stressing that support was voiced in Rome for the Republic of Croatia for its constructive approach in dealing with outstanding issues, while Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's contribution in Geneva received particularly good review.

Tudjman Chairs National Security, Defense Council

LD0212230293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] The 32d session of the Presidential National Security and Defense Council was held today under the chairmanship of the President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman.

President Tudjman and Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, spoke about the results of the conferences in Geneva and Rome. It was said in this regard that the European Union had united for the first time, rallying around the French-German initiative that contains important elements of President Tudjman's peace initiative. The council pointed out that Croatia's position has been significantly bolstered at the Geneva and Rome conferences and that Croatia should continue advocating political solutions to all problems with its constructive and principled policies and should guard the international reputation it has acquired.

The council is satisfied with the results scored by the Croatian delegation at the CSCE ministerial meeting in Rome, whose final document includes formulations suggested by Croatia. This particularly applies to the CSCE conclusions on the peaceful reintegration of Croatian territories under UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] supervision into Croatia's state and legal system, and the conclusion on the need for mutual recognition between Croatia and Serbia as one of the basic preconditions for the establishment of peace in this part of Europe.

Reviewing the results of the anti-inflation program so far, the council concluded that they were encouraging but also binding in the upcoming period. Everything accomplished

so far and the consistent implementation of the envisaged measures create conditions for the planned and gradual introduction of a convertible Croatian currency. Optimism is also generated by the European Union's readiness to help in Croatia's reconstruction and by very positive assessments by international banking institutions and organizations whose experts are currently in Croatia attentively monitoring the implementation of the stabilization program. Their evaluations provide realistic opportunities for concluding agreements with international financial institutions.

The council also discussed the freedom of the media in Croatia and assessed that it was in conformity with high international standards with which formal and legal regulations, and the tax system in this area still remain to be coordinated, with the aim of achieving the normal functioning of the media and a state governed by law, as well as preventing abuse and illegal operations.

RSK Presidential Candidate Wants 'Unification'

LD0212203593 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1850 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—[RSK Interior Minister] Milan Martic, candidate for president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], declared in TANJUG's [as received] talk show this evening that his ultimate strategic objective is the struggle for the unification of all Serbian lands on the territory of former Yugoslavia into one state.

"I am one of the most passionate advocates of the unification of Serbian lands," he stressed. "The process of unifying the Serbian lands is under way and nobody can stop it."

Martic also singled out other priority tasks—strengthening the defense system so that "the enemy cannot snatch even a square inch of territory", strengthening the legal system, revitalizing the economy, and improving the RSK population's living standards, especially the social position of the wounded and the families of fighters killed in combat.

The RSK interior minister laid special emphasis on the need for an aggressive foreign policy and strengthening the RSK negotiating position.

He expressed his conviction that the first multiparty and democratic presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 12 December will be fair and will boost the legitimacy of the RSK on the international scene.

Ambassador Nobilo Discusses Human Rights at UN

LD0212214393 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Excerpt] Croatian Ambassador to the United Nations Mario Nobilo yesterday addressed the third committee of the UNGA [UN General Assembly] within the framework of a discussion on human rights, the HINA agency reports today. Ambassador Nobilo conveyed to the UNGA the Croatian Government's satisfaction with the results of the world conference on human rights held in Geneva and said that the final document was a solid foundation for the protection and promotion of human rights. He said that Croatia supported the foundation of the international tribunal for crimes committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

One of my government's greatest causes of concern is the violation of human rights of the remaining Croats and non-Serbs in UN Protected Areas [UNPAs] and pink zones in Croatia, said Nobilo, recalling that Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN special envoy for human rights, had confirmed in his report that Serbs ethnically cleansed almost all parts of these Croatian areas.

The Croatian ambassador also dwelt on tragic events in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] where the Serb aggression developed into a three-sided conflict. The situation would have taken a different turn had the international community reacted at the beginning of the Serbian aggression, Nobilo stressed, adding that the Croatian Government strongly condemned all violations of human rights in B-H, regardless of which side committed them, including extremists on the side of Bosnian Croats. We also deeply regret the recent destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar. Croats in central Bosnia are also seriously at risk because of the Bosnian Muslim offensive.

Before the conflict, Croats constituted 18 percent of the B-H population and are now restricted to 10 percent of the state territory, stressed the Croatian ambassador to the UN. Of about 750,000 Croats who lived in B-H, 12,000 were killed during the war, while 44 percent of the remaining population were expelled. About 150,00 are encircled in central Bosnian enclaves, Nobilo said. [passage omitted]

Federal

Party Leaders Comment on Geneva Talks

LD0212185193 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1718 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 2 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Vice-Prime Minister Zeljko Simic said on Thursday [2 December] that the current peace talks in Geneva on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia would favourably affect the Serb people "and, thus, Serbia as well."

Simic told a press conference that the European Union (E.U.) tried to transform Serbia into a dominion and rob the Serbs of their statehood, but that now it is taking into consideration the reality which denies all accusations against the Serbs.

Simic, who heads the election list for Belgrade of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) at the December 19 early parliamentary elections, said that the socialists are not ignoring the price which had to be paid for the strong support to the Serbs outside Serbia, but added that it is much lower that that "we would have had to pay had we succumbed to influences and pressure from abroad."

Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the biggest parliamentary opposition party in Yugoslavia, told a press conference on Thursday that the Geneva conference has not achieved any result and criticized the representatives of Yugoslavia for going to Geneva in the first place.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in Geneva represented by the presidents of its two republics, Serbia and Montenegro: Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic.

Seselj assessed the Serbian president's speech at Monday's plenary session as an address aimed at the domestic public and a part of the election campaign.

Novak Kilibarda, tve leader of the parliamentary opposition People's Party of Montenegro (NS), said on Thursday that the current Geneva talks are a failure because 'the future of Yugoslavia remains at a dead end.'

Milan Paroski, the leader of the non-parliamentary opposition People's Party (NS) of Serbia told a press conference on Thursday that there is no international plan which 'forbids the integration of the Serb states.'

Foreign Currency Increasingly Scarce

LD0212123693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1138 GMT 2 Dec 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, December 2 (TANJUG)—Foreign currency was among the most scarce "goods" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) after 18 months of drastic economic sanctions severing all financial transactions with foreign countries.

The German mark Belgrade street value on Thursday morning [2 December] soared to 60 million dinars, while street currency dealers forecast it would reach an equivalent of 100 million dinars by the end of the week.

The national currency slumped daily several score percent against the convertible currency. Experts forecast the dinar would very soon stop being a means of payment.

Although the dinar was officially pegged to the U.S. dollar, the German mark reigned unchallenged in Yugoslavia. Even the peasants at green markets state the prices of farm produce in German marks.

The official exchange rate was trying to keep pace with the blackmarket rate, but the street currency dealers are constantly ahead. The ten largest banks adjusted on a daily basis the dinar's official exchange rate to the leading world currencies. The street market the very next day offered ten or so percent more than their official competitors.

Due to the disturbance in the goods and money markets, the exchange rate was practically formed solely on the basis of supply/demand, while the purchasing power and the balance of payments were of less importance. Production has nearly come to a standstill due the embargo, so that along with the artificially created shortages of certain goods the prices were soaring, the exchange rate was on the rise, and on and on and on.

The pensioners in Serbia receive Thursday the third part of their pensions for November, which stand at the average of 100 million dinars or under two German marks at the street rate.

This was enough for six liters of milk, the price of which was 17 million on Thursday. Meat was more than a luxury not only for pensioners but also for the working people as a kilo costs an average 400 million dinars, which is nearly 7 German marks.

The trade unions of Serbia, in accord with the republican government and the chamber of economy, set the minimum wage in Serbia for November at 315 million dinars.

At the time when it was set, on November 26, the minimum wage was worth an equivalent of 21 German marks at the street value. Most of the firms have not even secured the money for the wages, when the value on Thursday dropped to somewhat over 5 German marks.

The F.R.Y., which despite its 10.4-million population cares also for some 600,000 officially registered refugees from the war-affected former Yugoslav republics, has for under two year dropped to a level of the least developed African countries from a category of the medium developed central European countries.

If the sanctions continue for some time, experts say there will be this winter four million people literally exposed to starvation.

Industrial Production Improvements Noted

LD0212141693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1251 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—Production in the FRY saw a constant increase in August (4.9 percent), September (4.1 percent), and October (8.5 percent) compared with the first six months of 1993. However, it is not certain whether this positive trend will continue, it was said today at a meeting of the production council of the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy.

All energy industries saw an increase in production compared to last month, with the production of coal and electricity scoring the highest increase. [passage omitted]

Albania, Germany Criticized for Toxic Dumping

LD0212155693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1452 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 2 (TANJUG)—The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on Thursday [2 December] strongly criticized Albania and Germany for acting contrary to international conventions and dumping toxic waste in Albanian territory close to the Yugoslav border.

The German Embassy in Belgrade on Thursday conveyed its government's statement that the 460 tonnes of pesticide, exported from Germany to Albania, were incorrectly stored in 17 train cars near the Albanian-Yugoslav border and that their leakage can be extremely dangerous for the environment.

The government warned that also threatened is the Yugoslav national park Skadarsko Jezero Lake with its surroundings.

The Yugoslav Government ordered that all steps be taken to determine whether, when and in what way the toxic waste passed through Yugoslav territory.

The corresponding services in the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro have been ordered to test the quality of the water and air in the vicinity of the Skadarsko Jezero Lake, which is divided between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Last week the German press revealed that a train with 217 tonnes of toxic pesticides is parked near the Albanian port of Shkoder and that the cars are leaking badly thus threatening the entire Balkan region and Italian coast with an ecological catastrophe.

Serbia

Demonstrations Outside U.S., German Embassies

AU0312083593 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] We are now returning to Belgrade where a protest of the White Rose and New Byzantium is underway outside the U.S. Embassy. The reporter of the 202 Program, Vlada Jovancevic, reports from there:

[Jovancevic] The gathering outside the German and the U.S. Embassies started with chanting "Sanctions—Genocide and Child Murderers."

The Serbian Democratic Party for Serbia and the White Rose say that, in the future, they will gather outside these two embassies every Thursday as a sign of protest. Novelist Radomir Smiljanic points out that the policy of Yugoslavia's disintegration has been created in these places. The march upon the Balkans and the Africanization of its peoples started here. Smiljanic says further that the poison stored in Shkodra was deliberately transported there and is intended for the Slavic people.

The German Federal Republic of Genscher and Kohl has bloodied its hands and must be held responsible for this, Smiljanic concluded.

The participants of the protest are holding some 20 improvised crosses in their hands. It is planned that Jovica Vlahovic, who was announced as the commander of the blockade on the Danube River, and Dr. Mihajlo Vucinic, representative of the Serbs from Croatia, will also speak.

This will be all from Knez Milos Street for now.

Royalists Plan 4 Dec Protest at U.S. Embassy

LD0212165293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1250 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—Duke Sinisa Vucinic, chairman of the Serbian Royalist Movement [SRP—Srpski Rojalisticki Pokret], today called on all Serbian royalists and patriots to take part in a protest to be held on 4 December in front of the U.S. Embassy [in Belgrade] against "America's fascist policy toward the Serbian nation."

Vucinic told a news conference that the protest will be organized by his party, and that a protest letter will be sent to the U.S. Government.

Vucinic recalled that the SRP will contest the elections independently with the aim of establishing a monarchy, headed by Tomislav Karadjordjevic, and unifying Serb lands.

He accused the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia of copying the program of the [ruling] Socialist Party of Serbia, and of advocating and supporting the ruling party's policies.

Milan Panic Plans To Unite Opposition

AU0212171893 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Dec 93 p 8

[Report by Verica Rupar on an interview with former Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic in Belgrade; date not given: "Panic: I Have Come To Unite the Opposition"]

[Text] A minor confusion took place in the luxurious suite of the Hyatt Hotel, the Belgrade home of the U.S.

millionaire and former Yugoslav prime minister, that evening. "The president is coming in a minute, he is taking a rest, he had so many talks today," Panic's adviser Mihajlo Saranovic tells us. Panic's wife Sally is watching a television newscast, the driver has gone to fetch the other adviser, Dr. Ljubisa Rakic, and the secretary and the security people are sharing the job of answering the incessant telephone calls.

It is almost 2000 and some nervousness over the delay is only normal: The main meeting is to open at 2200 in the Hotel Intercontinental, where Panic is to meet the opposition parties' leaders and to try to convince them, for the third time within only a few days, to run at the elections togaether.

Are you going to manage that, I ask him at the beginning of the interview. "Of course," he says convinced, in the same way that has been confusing for domestic and world public for the last year and a half. The politically naive staunch supporter of U.S. optimism, the man of hope, America's puppet—one remembers remarks from numerous comments that followed the brief political carrier of the 63-year old pharmaceutical magnate.

[Rupar] You have come to Belgrade to unite the opposition. Why?

[Panic] Because I think that only a united opposition has the chance to win. It is my task to unite it. Separate, parties have no chances at the coming elections. This is a young opposition, but it managed to mature within the past three years, just as the entire system is maturing. I do not think we are ever again going to have such an assembly as the one of a year ago.

Convincing the World

[Rupar] What is your political position?

[Panic] It is the position of a non-party person. I am not a candidate, I have no personal interests, the only interest I have is the interest of my, the Serbian, people. I want to establish peace and introduce democracy here, and I will do everything with a view to helping that happen.

[Rupar] You are not in Belgrade all the time, so how can you help?

[Panic] I am working a lot for the Serbian cause in the world. I have given more than 50 hours of television interviews and about 25,000 texts have been published in which I speak about the essence of the crisis here. I have fought against the U.S. intervention in Bosnia, I told the Americans: "Do not allow your children to go to war again and let monuments be erected to a new Vietnam." I spoke against the sending of weapons to the Muslims, I told the U.S. Administration that it is better to send troops to Macedonia. I consider it to be my personal achievement that four advisers in the State Department in charge of Bosnia have been replaced. Wherever I go, I speak against sanctions; they have never had any results and will destroy this people.

[Rupar] The report that you met U.S. President Clinton was publicized in Belgrade. What did you talk about?

[Panic] It was a dinner for 700 guests. As I have made many people in the U.S. Administration angry at me, I thought that I had been invited only to sit silently at my table during that time. However, they had announced my presence as one of the honorary guests. After the dinner, (?Bill Pres) invited me to visit Clinton....

(At that moment, a secretary brings a piece of paper to Panic with (?Bill Pres) written on it. Panic cheerfully waves his hands: "Can you imagine, we were just saying.... and there is this telephone call." He comes back after about 10 minutes.)

I can tell you the news: The U.S. Democratic Party is going to express its support for the democratic opposition in Serbia and will do so officially.

"I Am Not Naive"

[Rupar] Let us continue. What was the talk with Clinton like?

[Panic] We have known each other for about five years, particularly well from the Dukakis campaign. Of course, I immediately started talking about sanctions, about how harmful they are, how they are destroying life here. He said that it is not the right moment to talk about sanctions, that it is better to talk about the global issues of the crisis here. What shall I tell you? For him, we represent a problem and nobody likes problems....

[Rupar] What is your impression? Is there any chance of the sanctions being lifted?

[Panic] This French-German initiative is a propagandist move, something for internal use, that is, for one's own and for the European public. Unfortunately, the sanctions will be made even harsher if nothing major happens here. If the opposition fails to unite and win at the elections.

[Rupar] Your idea on unifying the opposition sounds naive to many people.

[Panic] I am not naive. I feel responsible for not having been able to carry out changes here. I simply could not believe that such manipulations, such great manipulations are possible. Had all that energy spent on manipulations been used in a positive direction, there would have been no end to our success.

[Rupar] Vojislav Seselj was a fierce opponent of yours. What do you think of him now?

[Panic] I have heard that he said that he did not think like this about me, but that Milosevic made him attack me so much. Let him come and swear on the Bible.... I am joking, he is not a serious topic.

[Rupel] What is your attitude toward the Serbian president? You, nevertheless, entered political life at his invitation. Does the fact that you are criticizing him today mean that you were wrong?

(This is the first time that the eloquent and energetic Panic fails to reply immediately. The reply that follows is calm).

[Panic] When dealing with business, Milosevic was very correct. I have absolutely nothing to reproach for him. Regarding politics, however, he is not trustworthy. Particularly not so since the London conference. I would say that his basic problem lies in the fact that he has poor advisers. He has surrounded himself with a group of wrong people. If I were him, I would tender my resignation. I am not excluding the possibility that he may do so.

[Rupar] Have you got any information that this issue is being linked to the lifting of sanctions?

[Panic] The world wants to change the system here under the pressure of the sanctions. I know that these people are not fair; with their sanctions, they caused a tragedy in this country, they have destroyed the middle class.... The Americans say: "We have a moral responsibility for those poor people." And it is they who are making these people poor! On the other hand, here you have the authorities who are incapable of solving a single problem. The Serbs are a proud people, but this fact should not be politically abused. The world public is tired of us. It is not a shame to beg for humanitarian aid, it is our national interest to survive and recover. And there is hope, yes there is, if the opposition unites and wins at elections.

At the exit, in a hurry, in reply to the last question of whether he would come back if this does happen, Panic says the following: "I am not a politician, but if I am invited, I may be able to help with sorting out the monetary chaos, with international recognition, with negotiations with the IMF.... I would be happy to be able to help."

BORBA Reports 'Secret' RSK-Croatia Talks

AU0212170293 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Dec 93 p 13

[Report by S. Radulovic and B. Solesa: "After Oslo—Belgrade"]

[Text] Belgrade—At the end of last week, precisely between Wednesday and Saturday, secret Krajina-Croatian talks have been held "somewhere in the vicinity of Belgrade" BORBA has learned from circles close to the Krajina's leadership. Although the result of the meeting of the two delegations that were led by Krajina leader Goran Hadzic and the head of the Croatian negotiating team, Slavko Degoricija, is not known, we have learned unofficially that this was the continuation of the secret talks that started in Oslo. The main topic of the talks was an agreement on an end to hostilities, and negotiations about the so-called economic issues.

Bearing in mind that all Krajina regions, with the exception of Northern Dalmatia, have made separate cease-fire agreements with the Croatian side, there is only the solution to the three key issues on which the overall cease-fire agreement depends that still needs to be found. Although the Krajina officials are quoting the negotiating platform passed by the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (separating lines with Croatia of 3 January 1992) we have learned unofficially that, in the latest secret negotiations, the option in which the area of Maslenica Bridge, Peruca [hydropower plant], and Zemunik airport would belong to the Croatian side while the separating lines in Zadar hinterland would run through the Serbian villages of Smokovic and Islam Grcki has been mentioned most frequently. It is not known what would happen with the part of Velebit that has, in the meantime, been occupied by the Croatian side.

In any case, this option is much less favorable that the Erdut agreement, according to which the Croatian sides would have to withdraw from all occupied parts of Krajina while the Krajina police would be present in Smokovic, Kasic, and Islam Grcki, which are now being held by the Croats.

Allegedly, the aforementioned option of separation caused divisions within the Krajina delegation, which besides Hadzic also included General Mile Novakovic, commander of the Serbian Army of Krajina, Prime Minister Djordje Bjegovic, Justice Minister Radomir Kuzet, and Interior Minister Slobodan Jarcevic. However, the key person who insisted on debate about this option was Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, whom the Krajina negotiators regularly informed about the proceedings of the negotiations and who, as BORBA has learned from the same sources, was opposed to the Krajina delegation travelling to Geneva.

Opposition Cites Irregularities in Voter Numbers

AU0212164693 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Dec 93 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Surplus of Voters in Pristina and Leskovac"]

[Text] Belgrade—The Serbian Institute for Statistics published, in the SLUZBENI GLASNIK of 25 October 1993, the number of voters in all nine constituent units in Serbia.

The number of voters in seven constituent units is identical to the number of voters at the 1992 elections, which is incredible as it suggests that no change has occurred over a whole year. This is expressed in a public statement by the Commission for the Control of the Elections of the Democratic Movement of Serbia [Depos].

To make things even more incredible, there has been a change in the electoral body in the remaining two constituent units (Pristina and Leskovac). Thus there are 165,000 more voters in Pristina and 45,000 more in Leskovac, the Depos Commission claims.

Such a magnificent lack of deaths, births, and migration in seven constituent units, and a vast increase in the other two demands an explanation from the authorities—if it is really needed, since 310,000 [all figures as published] newly-found voters in two constituent units

that give 50 deputies are enough to bring the authorities the parliamentary majority even before the elections.

The opposition parties and the coalitions are warning the authorities that such a rigging of the number of voters could bring into question the regularity of the coming elections, the statement says.

Djindjic To Run for Prime Minister

AU0212153693 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Dec 93 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Djindjic Is Running for Prime Minister"]

[Text] If the Democratic Party [DS] gets the majority vote at the December elections, Zoran Djindjic, chairman of the DS Executive Committee and the main candidate on all the lists, sees himself as Serbian prime minister. He confirmed this at yesterday's news conference, commenting on POLITIKA's question whether the style of the DS campaign was indicating that he was a candidate for prime minister.

If we get the majority vote, Dr. Djindjic said, our government will immediately come up with a concrete package of measures, and it will not ask for 100 days to do something concrete. Asked how achievable was his claim that fuel could cost one German mark, he explained that fuel was a strategic supply that would be taken from the hands of private entrepreneurs and placed under the exclusive authority of the state.

Commenting on the Geneva talks, Dr. Djindjic stressed that none of the key issues—peace in Bosnia and the lifting of the sanctions—depended on the Serbian side. That is why the pressure on the FRY was so unprincipled. As for the international humanitarian aid, he said that the international community was showing double standards when it came to the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

SDA of Sandzak Decides To Boycott Elections

AU0212161493 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] The main committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Sandzak passed a decision that this most numerous party of the Muslims in Serbia will not take part in the December elections. This was announced in Novi Pazar by the party's secretary general Rasim Ljajic. Bisera Vukasinovic reports:

[Begin Vukasinovic recording] We believe that in the circumstances of extensive searches of Muslim homes, pronounced repression, detentions, political trials, threats of arrest to SDA leader Sulejman Ugljanin, and massive migrations of the Muslims, not even the minimal conditions for free and democratic elections exist, Ljajic said. He accuses the current authorities of trying to prevent the participation of the SDA in the electoral campaign at all costs. For this reason, as he said, sporadic appeals issued to the Muslims to take part in the elections sound just too malicious.

We believe that such a decision will animate the authorities in Serbia to begin political talks about the status of Sandzak, which would contribute toward our accelerated integration into the political life of this country. The SDA remains faithful to its political orientation that political talks and democratic dialogue are the only way to resolve all controversial political questions, SDA secretary general Rasim Ljajic stated in Novi Pazar today when he was explaining the decision to boycott the elections. [end recording]

Lawyer: Authorities 'Ready' To Arrest Seselj

AU0212153893 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Dec 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "They Will Arrest Seselj Before Elections"]

[Text] "I believe that the authorities are getting ready to arrest Seselj, and I do not think they will let him participate in the elections. The main reason for this is that Seselj has said many true things about the present authorities, things that the so-called opposition has not had the nerve to say during these four years. Since the marriage between the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party has ended, Seselj has now offered himself as the so-called 'protected witness' or a 'penitent' at the tribunal in the Hague, since he really does know a lot. He has done this to avoid being deported there," says Dr. Rajko Danilovic, eminent Belgrade lawyer, for the Novi Sad SVET.

Asked what he thinks is the fate of another former client of his, Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, Danilovic says: "Arkan's campaign very much resembles Seselj's campaign of last year. I fear that their fate will be identical. His position is not simple at all since he is on all these lists of people to be delivered to the Hague. He is trying to save himself and I can understand that perfectly well."

Macedonia

Foreign Minister Urges Talks With Greece

AU0212141693 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 2 Dec 93

[Unattributed report: "Letter to Butrus-Ghali"]

[Text] The Macedonian foreign minister sent a letter to UN General Secretary Butrus-Ghali in regard to the negotiations between Greece and Macedonia.

"We were assured," the letter says, "that the problems resulting from certain issues, opposed by Greece, would be overcome with the help of the world organization, as a mediator. We consider the previous talks to have been useful. That is why the Macedonian Government regrets the other party's government decision to halt the negotiations. The Macedonian Government remains strongly

inclined to further and more intensify talks, including direct negotiations between representatives of the two governments. We firmly believe that it is the only way to reach results, which would contribute to the peace and stability of other countries, and of the region as a whole. Ultimatums, pressures, and involvement in internal affairs of other countries are measures that cannot possibly be acceptable means for normalizing the relations between the two countries. They are contradictory to the UN Charter, and can only complicate matters, which is certainly not in the interest of the peace and stability in this region. The Macedonian Government expects from you and the Security Council to intercede in favor of continuing the talks between Macedonia and Greece," is said in a part of the letter to Mr.[Butrus-]Ghali.

New Telecommunications Link With Albania

AU0312091093 Skopje MIC in English 2 Dec 93

[Unattributed report: "Transbalkan Line Begins To Function"]

[Text] The postal organizations of Macedonia and Albania recently connected their telecommunications systems, and through the capacities of this neighbor, the direct telephone communications with Italy have been restored. These links are currently in a test period.

This analogue telecommunications lines is a continuation of the already installed telephone line Skopje-Sofia-Istanbul, whereby the transbalkan telecommunications line is restored.

The new telecommunications corridor will open for Macedonia a new alternative telecommunications direction with the Western European countries and the countries in the world.

Kosovo

Serbian Police Reportedly Beat, Arrest Albanians

AU0212173593 Tirana ATA in English 0917 GMT 2 Dec 93

[Text] Tirana, December 2 (ATA)—The Serbian police recently resorted to violence against the participants in the manifestations to mark the November 28 holiday. According to reports, the Serbian police beat and arrested more than 100 Albanians, activists of Albanian political parties and associations.

The Serbian police stopped the manifestation in the G[illegible]ve village of Kline Province and beat more than 30 persons, arrested 16 out of them, and caused great damage to the school premises. The Serbian police also used violence against Albanians in other villages of Gllogovc commune, removed the Albanian national flag raised to mark the November 28 holiday, and misused several Albanians.

The Serbian police beat and arrested dozens of activists of the Democratic League of Kosova and other Albanians in Podujeve commune and students and teachers in the schools of Doberdol, Ternave, Lup, and other regions.

Rights Group Encourages Serb-Albanian Dialogue

AU0312095393 Tirana ATA in English 0925 GMT 3 Dec 93

["Delegation of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Visits Kosova"—ATA headline]

[Text] Pristina, December 2 (ATA)—A delegation of the Geneva-based UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination visited Kosova and conducted talks with representatives from Albanian political parties and other associations of Kosova.

The mission of the committee concerned itself in creating possibilities for dialogue between the Albanians and Serbs to resolve concrete problems in Albanian education, health and Albanian information in Kosova. The mission learned that the Geneva talks on the Albanian education in Kosova were not successful and that the Albanians demand that the question of education be treated separately.

The UN delegation also concerned itself in the political opinion and aspirations of the Albanian people of Kosova. Dr. Fehmi Agani, deputy chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova, said that in the 1991 referendum the people of Kosova declared themselves in favour of Kosova as a sovereign and independent state, adding that Kosova has had its autonomy and that it is a precondition for any talks with the Serbs.

On December 2 the delegation had separate meetings with Adem Demaci, chairman of the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms in Pristina, Adil Fetahu, secretary general of the Union of the Independent Trade Unions of Kosova, and with lawyers and jurists in Kosova.

During the talk, Adem Demaci said that the first issue of the Albanian-Serbian dialogue should be the Albanian Radio and Television in Kosova and that, without a free media there can be no equal talks with the Serbs.

The delegation also met with the academician Rexhep Qosja who said if a ruling minority with a colonialist mentality exercises systematic terror and violence on an absolute majority, such as the case of Kosova, we have no more to do with violation of human rights, but with a colonialist exploitation of a whole people.